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Abstract 
This report generates estimates for the effect of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on trade 
unit values. Adding to the latest development of the NTM analysis, we account for 
different types of NTMs for pairs of countries/regions. Our estimates thus provide new 
insights about the bilaterally distinct effect of specific NTMs. This is particularly 
interesting for policy makers that like to know which types of measures are relevant for 
trade from or to specific countries/regions and whether they are trade-hampering or 
trade-facilitating. 
We elaborate on the estimation of the price effect (measured in trade unit values) vis-à-
vis the standard gravity on trade quantities (measured in trade value). A panel dataset 
(2012-2015) using the last releases of trade unit values (Berthou & Emlinger, 2011) and 
UNCTAD NTMs global database is built, and alternative approaches to account for the 
distinct bilateral impact are tested on beef, white meat (poultry and pork) and milk. The 
focus is on trade between the EU member states and relevant regions with which the EU 
is negotiating or has just completed trade agreements: MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Japan and 
New Zealand.  
In this report, we do not implement the specific Ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) estimates 
for NTMs in a simulation model but rather provide a literature review that elaborates on 
the different approaches to depict NTMs in simulation models. The next step would be the 
application of the AVEs estimated in a simulation model in order to gauge the economy-
wide effects of the respective NTMs under review. 
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Executive Summary 
The objective of this report is to develop an analysis of non-tariff measures (NTMs) by 
both econometric and simulation models. The first and main part of the report is devoted 
to the review of alternative approaches to estimate the trade impact and ad-valorem 
equivalents (AVE) of non-tariff measures (NTMs) in the gravity equation modeling 
context. Empirically, the report explores the price approach in some specific intensely 
traded agri-food sectors and illustrates alternative methods to estimate different AVEs by 
trade routes. In particular, the focus is put on three agri-food sectors, beef, white meat 
(poultry and pork) and dairy, and the bilateral route between the EU Member States and 
MERCOSUR, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan and New 
Zealand. The second part reviews the state of the art approaches to depict NTMs in 
simulation models. In the simulation models, the approaches rely on AVE estimates for 
NTMs, like the ones generated by the econometric application, and they are the link 
between the first and second part of this report. 
Estimation of the NTM impact 
The impact of NTMs on trade has been traditionally studied by gravity-type estimations. 
In the estimation equation, bilateral trade (in value) is explained by a set of unilateral 
and bilateral trade partners’ specific variables, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
distance and other geographical, historical and cultural variables. Recent studies apply 
the price approach, where the gravity dependent variable is the bilateral trade unit value, 
and accordingly, the price (or cost) effect caused by NTMs is obtained directly from the 
estimation. Empirically, the price approach is challenging not only because of the poor 
data quality but also because information of prices is not available in the absence of 
trade. The standard quantity approach of estimating the NTM effect can account for zero 
or missing trade and may thus be preferred when zero-trade values are common ground. 
The estimates of the quantity approach usually indicate a negative trade effect, and 
accordingly, Ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) have a positive sign, but this is not always 
the case. Such positive effects of NTMs point towards the situation where measures 
actually facilitate trade. While positive estimates are generated, the positive effect has 
been traditionally neglected in simulation models that emphasize the (trade) costs due to 
NTMs and hence the decreases of trade costs when NTMs are reduced or abolished. 
We apply the price approach as in Cadot and Gourdon (2016), but, differently from them, 
we built a panel dataset (2012-2015). After taking logarithms, we run our price model 
with an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator and obtain the coefficients needed to 
calculate the marginal effect of NTMs. Alternative specifications of the NTMs are 
contemplated (presence and regulatory intensity) as well as alternative ways to get 
specific impacts by bilateral route. Further improvements of the methodology would go in 
the direction of combining the price and quantity approaches, following recent 
developments by Gourdon et al.(2018), to aim at disentangling the trade-hampering 
(negative) and trade-facilitating (positive) effects of NTMs. 
Specification of the equation of the price model to be estimated 
In the price-gravity model, the bilateral trade unit values, i.e. price per unit of trade, are 
explained by a set of variables like distance and other geographical and cultural variables 
(e.g. contiguity, common language, colonial linkage) that are commonly used in gravity-
type estimations, ad-valorem tariffs and some metrics for NTMs, either a dummy variable 
to capture the presence/absence of measures being in place (d=1/0) or a continuous 
variable that count the measures in place and hence represent the regulatory intensity 
(RI). Alternative specifications of the NTM variable have consequences in the 
interpretation. For instance, using RI, the coefficient measures the marginal trade-cost 
effect of increasing the average number of measures in the sample by one unit, and to 
obtain what we call the “Gross AVE” we need to multiply this marginal effect, which can 
be very small, with the actual number of measures in place. We also introduce country 
(importer and exporter), product (HS6 codes) and year fixed effects in order to control 
for unobserved influences.  
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The trade unit values (from the CEPII Trade Unit Value Database) measured in cost 
insurance freight (CIF) prices are used as the dependent variable in our estimations. One 
main advantage of unit values in comparison with other prices datasets, like those based 
on consumer price data, is that they are available at a high sectoral disaggregation (HS6 
digits) and that they are bilateral or exporter-importer specific. Furthermore, the Cost, 
Insurance and Freight (CIF) values are based on the importers’ declarations that include 
all trade costs like NTMs and other charges, except for tariffs and domestic taxes when 
crossing the border.  
In the estimation, we investigate the NTM effect by trade routes between the EU and the 
specific partner countries/regions under review. Usually, ad-valorem equivalent estimates 
(AVEs) for NTMs are not estimated for pairs of trade partners but rather for each 
importer, given the lack of bilateral information on NTMs or sufficient variability in cross-
section estimations. In practical terms, this implies assuming that the trade cost impact 
induced by NTMs is homogeneous across exporters facing the same destination market. . 
While adding to the literature and the standard estimation methods, our AVE estimates 
for different types of measures for pairs of countries/region provide new insights about 
the bilaterally distinct effect of specific types of measures. This is particularly interesting 
for policy makers to know which measures are relevant for trade from or to specific 
countries/regions and whether they are trade-hampering or trade-facilitating. Two 
alternative specifications are pursued: the “NTM route interaction” and the “indirect route 
characteristics” approaches. The latter, in particular, is measured through importer and 
exporter trade shares. 
Application to EU bilateral trade routes with specific partner countries and 
products under review 
In the estimation, the focus is on certain country and product combinations relevant from 
the EU perspective. For the EU and the respective partner countries, we bilaterally 
specify the data along the trade routes at HS 6-digit. Concerning the NTM data, we take 
the starting and ending date of the measures provided in the UNCTAD NTM database. We 
thus add the temporal dimension to the NTM data. Using time series of NTMs adds to the 
literature since studies (except for UNCTAD, 2017b) usually include NTMs as snapshots of 
a certain year, thereby constraining the econometric estimation to a cross section. In our 
analysis, we conduct panel estimations using data for the period 2012-2015, as already 
mentioned.  
Summary of results - ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMS 
The results of the estimation show that the NTM effect estimated by dummy variables for 
NTMs (representing that at least one measure is in place or not) is generally larger than 
the effect estimated by frequency variables that reflect the regulatory intensity in terms 
of number of measures in place. Comparing specifications, the results for the frequency 
variables and thus the regulatory intensity overall appear as being more plausible. 
Likewise, amongst alternative specifications to capture the distinct AVE by bilateral route, 
the indirect characteristics approach provides also more plausible results. Consequently, 
we focus on the results provided by both.  
NTMs are found to have a significant cost-rising effect in every sector. Using the 
reference of the average number of measures in the sample, the Gross AVEs for beef, 
other meats and dairy, are on average, 15, 11 and 6%, respectively.  
Differentiating between different categories of NTMs reveals a significant positive effect 
on the trade unit value and thus prices for Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures in 
beef, other meat and milk, with estimated AVEs of 8, 6 and 7%, respectively. According 
to the estimation results, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures also increase the 
price for beef in 8%, while non-significant effects are found in the case of other meats 
and dairy. It is also interesting to note that the NTM effect on the trade unit value is 
generally more pronounced than the effect of tariffs, on average, which underlines the 
importance of NTMs vis-a-vis tariffs for agri-food products (in the period 2012-2015 of 
the panel estimation).  
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The AVEs for NTMs estimated for specific bilateral routes are always positive and 
significant and thus cost or price rising. Overall, it appears that the NTMs of the EU have 
a relatively larger effect than the NTMs of the other countries/regions, at least in meats. 
Specifically, the AVEs for NTMs with the EU as destination country are 16-20% for beef, 
and 12-13% for other meat, while the average AVEs in the sample are 15 and 11%, 
respectively. 
At the same time, the results reveal that in the price approach the NTM effect crucially 
depends on the country of origin. This means that one measure can lead to different 
compliance costs for different export countries. This could be particularly true when the 
exporters’ regulations are more similar (in terms of definition and scope) to those 
adopted by the importer. 
Application in simulation models  
We presented approaches to depict NTMs in simulation models as follows: modelling 
approaches of NTMs at the border that depict measures as wedges between the import 
and export price (tariffs/export tax), as margin commodities or as “iceberg tariffs”, 
approaches that model NTMs as shifts of the supply and demand curve or combinations 
thereof, and most recent approaches that model NTMs in heterogeneous firms models 
(e.g. Jafari and Britz, 2018). In particular, the differentiation between fixed and variable 
costs makes the heterogeneous firms approach interesting since NTMs often result in 
investment costs when certain requirements are to be met and thus also involve market 
structure effects. Likewise, such an analysis can shed light on the question about who 
actually benefits and loses due to NTMs and/or due the NTM reduction, which is typically 
negotiated and agreed upon in trade agreements. 
Until now, the cost-increasing effect of NTMs is emphasized in most modelling 
approaches, with simulations depicting the NTM reduction by a decrease in trade costs. 
The “iceberg tariff” approach has become the standard method to depicting NTM 
reductions in simulation models. Two effects are essentially modelled: decrease of the 
price of the specific import product initially subject to the NTM, which results in an 
increase of the quantity demanded of imports, and a decrease of the imported product 
needed in order to generate the same utility. The latter constitutes an efficiency effect 
that in the end results in a generally more pronounced impact of NTMs in the “iceberg 
tariff” approach. 
Only few studies consider the different effects of NTMs, including the rents that NTMs can 
cause. In particular, the benefits of NTMs (measured by the consumers’ willingness to 
pay or in the case of SPS measures the costs of losses due to disease outbreaks for 
example) are usually depicted in a cost-benefit framework applied in partial equilibrium 
models (van Tongeren et al, 2009 and 2010). One recent exception for an application of 
a computable equilibrium model is Walmsely and Minor (2016) that account for the 
benefit of overcoming obstacles due to NTMs in efforts of trade facilitation. They 
specifically depict the buyer’s willingness to pay for a fast delivery of products that 
reduces the time spent at customs and delays. 
The data requirement for modelling NTMs in simulation models is considerable. Given the 
literature, we conclude that the NTM impact first and foremost is an empirical question 
and further argue that a correct and well-founded specification of the gravity model 
employed for the estimation is crucial for bringing forward methodological approaches to 
depicting NTMs in simulation models. 
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1 Introduction 
The objective of the report is to further develop the analysis of non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) by both econometric and simulation models. More specifically, building on 
existing NTMs databases, it aims at improving a NTMs database which is further used in a 
price-dependent gravity equation, thereby overcoming some of the methodological 
limitations already identified in the literature in relation to the quantity and cross-section 
approaches. 
The specific goals are the following: 
● Comparing the price gap and quantity gap approaches in the estimation of 
AVEs for NTMs 
● Building an NTMs database with a time dimension 
● Providing AVE estimates for selected countries (EU and trading partners) and 
main agri-food products  
● Reviewing the state of the art approaches to implementing NTMs in simulation 
models 
The focus of this report is on NTMs for the EU and its main trade partners in specific 
intensely traded agri-food products. 
The report has the following structure: section 2 presents the price and quantity 
approaches to estimate NTMs. Section 3 describes the database employed for the 
analysis. A brief explanation on the price-approach theoretical model and empirical 
specification is presented in Section 4. In addition, Section 4 provides a review of the 
recent literature. The price approach is subsequently used to estimate ad-valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) for NTMs, and two alternative methodological approaches are 
explained and critically applied in order to get AVEs for specific bilateral routes of trade. 
These results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 contains the literature 
review on studies applying the state-of-the-art methods to depict NTMs in simulation 
models, both general equilibrium and partial equilibrium models. The report closes with 
concluding remarks and an outlook with insights for future developments on both data 
and methodological issues. In the appendix, a general protocol with the sequential stages 
of the estimation of the NTM effect is outlined (see Appendix A5). This includes the 
description of alternatives at each stage. 
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2 Price versus quantity approaches to estimating ad-
valorem equivalents (AVEs) of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
The impact of NTMs on trade has traditionally been studied in the context of a gravity 
equation, where bilateral trade (in value) is explained by a set of unilateral and bilateral 
trade partners specific variables, such as GDPs, distance and other geographical, 
historical and cultural variables. In a direct approach, an NTM indicator enters as an 
additional explanatory variable. In absence of explicit NTMs variables, the indirect 
approach infers “hidden trade costs” either from the residuals of the gravity equation or 
by comparing international with domestic trade flows (Head and Mayer, 2004; Chen and 
Novy, 2011). In any case, the impact of NTMs on bilateral trade needs to be translated 
into a price-equivalent by using elasticities of substitution, normally borrowed from the 
literature, but also estimated within the model. This has been traditionally called the 
quantity approach, but we will refer to it as the quantity-value approach, as the last 
methodological proposals use ‘pure’ quantities (i.e. quantity in physical units). 
Alternatively, a price approach implies either an arithmetic calculation of price-gaps (e.g. 
Bradford, 2003), or an econometric estimation of the price impact of NTMs. The lack of 
completeness of price databases has restricted the use of this approach, and only 
recently, it has regained momentum. Thus, Cadot and Gourdon (2014) used consumer 
prices to estimate the price rising impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) 
measures in African imports of food. More recently, two papers have used the new 
bilateral trade unit values database, to study the cost of intra-Mercosur trade induced by 
NTMs (UNCTAD, 2017b), and to estimate the cost induced by different types of NTMs 
worldwide and for all HS 6-digit sectors (Cadot and Gourdon, 2016). 
Cadot and Gourdon (2016) highlight that the empirical approach based on prices is 
unable to disentangle if “price rises that reflect compliance costs, demand increases due 
to quality signalling, or any combination of the two”. The authors also mention that, 
while a price rising effect of NTMs is expected, whatever the main driver is, the NTM 
effect on trade volumes is more indeterminate, as will depend on the relative shifts of 
supply and demand and their respective elasticities (Beghin et al., 2012). 
Cadot et al. (2018) point out two additional problems related to the price approach. First, 
imperfect monitoring of quantity of imports leads to gaps and inaccurate trade unit 
values. In this sense, the database refined by Berthou and Emlinger (2011) has notably 
contributed to the improvement of these data, while further refinements could still be 
possible (see data description in Section 2). And second, trade unit values do not include 
domestic intermediation margins, and as such, exclude shadow values for non-technical 
measures as licenses to domestic importers. 
Both empirical approaches, i.e. the price and quantity approach, may lead to negative 
AVEs. There is a clear and theoretically consistent explanation in the quantity approach; 
for example NTMs may facilitate trade by reducing information asymmetries, and thus 
have a positive effect on the quantity trade. However, effects on prices and here 
particular the possible lower value of the products traded are more difficult to interpret in 
the NTM context. Cadot and Gourdon (2016, p.229) explain that “…negative coefficients, 
i.e. negative AVEs, would imply that the presence of NTMs reduces trade unit values. The 
only case where such a price-reducing effect could possibly make sense economically is 
when a large country imposes a quantitative restriction, thereby depressing its 
demand.... leading to a lower before-quota unit value because of the large-country effect 
on the world price. However,... [such] effect would be felt on the products’ unit values 
for all country pairs, not just when imported by the country imposing the quota. It would 
then be picked up by the product fixed effect rather than the NTM coefficient”. 
Cadot and Gourdon (2016) use the NTM indicator of presence/absence and run a 
regression for each of the 4575 HS 6-digit lines, from which, 60% of the NTM coefficients 
are not significant at 10% (i.e. null effect); and from the significant coefficients,  15% 
are negative and replaced by missing values when aggregating;  and 20% were 
constrained to a maximum of +/-100% as unconstrained estimates led to larger values 
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(in absolute terms). These results highlight the difficulties of finding economic consistent 
values for AVEs based on the trade unit values database, at least, when dealing at the 
maximum sectoral disaggregation. 
Gourdon et al. (2018) complement the price approach with a parallel set of regressions 
on trade volumes to better ascertain possible trade enhancing effects of NTMs. The 
rationale is that the ‘value’ of trade (i.e. the traditional gravity ‘quantity-value approach’) 
may remain unaltered when the import demand elasticity is one. In this case, a cost-
increasing effect of NTMs leads to a decrease of the import volume demanded that is of 
the same size as the costs increase. The authors update the AVEs estimations conducted 
by Cadot and Gourdon (2016) for each country and HS 6-digit sector, obtained with the 
price approach, and provide aggregated figures for the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) sector classification. Besides, using the volume approach, they provide some 
evidence on market-creating effects of SPS measures in particular, arguing that SPS 
reduce information asymmetries (Henson and Jaffe, 2008; Xiong and Beghin, 2014) and 
contribute to build up confidence in the destination country for imports by signalling 
quality (Bureau et al., 1998). 
The combined use of the price and quantity (volume) approaches can help then to 
disentangle trade-costs and demand-enhancing effects of NTMs. Cadot et al. (2018, 
p.36-37) and Gourdon et al. (2018) provide further arguments and specific examples 
(see also Xiong and Beghin, 2014). 
In a nutshell, technical measures such as SPS and TBT imply compliance costs for the 
producers, but through the reduction of information asymmetries and externalities, 
technical measures may shift demand in the destination country (Figure A.1 in Gourdon, 
et al., 2018, p. 22 illustrates this point). The quantity approach can qualify the 
magnitude of the demand enhancing effect relative to the compliance cost (Cadot et al., 
2018, p.37): a positive price impact of NTMs may be accompanied by a positive volume 
effect (i.e. the demand shift outweighs compliance costs), a null volume effect (i.e. the 
demand shift just offsets compliance costs), or negative (i.e. the demand shift does not 
offset compliance costs, there is a weak market creating effect); in the case of no price 
and quantity impact of NTMs, the measure under review seems to be ineffective, ceteris 
paribus, or already internalized. Non-technical measures (e.g. quantitative restrictions), 
on the other hand, have a more clear trade-impeding objective and a negative or 
demand-depressing effect is expected. Empirically, the price approach is challenging not 
only because of the limitations of the data quality (see above) but also because in 
absence of trade there is no price information.  
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3 Data description 
3.1 General sample used in the estimation 
Table 1 describes the sectorial samples used in the estimation, and highlights the specific 
bilateral routes considered to investigate possible route specific NTMs impact on prices (  
12 
Table 2). Details on the sector or rather product definition are provided in the appendix 
A3 and A4; for the selection criteria see A2. 
Table 1: Description of the composition of the samples used in estimation.  
 
Sectors 
Number of 
product  
(HS6-
digit) 
Number of 
Observations 
(N) 
Number of 
importers 
Number of 
exporters 
Route 
R
e
d
 m
e
a
t/
 
b
e
e
f 
a
n
d
 l
a
m
b
 GTAP CMT: 
cattle meat 
29 30546 77 144 
from Mercosur 
(fmerco) / to EU 
(teu) 
from New Zealand 
(fNzl) / to EU 
from EU (feu) / to 
Asean (tasean) 
 
Magnet 
BFCMT: beef 
meat 
6 10194 75 126 
Magnet 
CMT: other 
cattle meat 
23 20352 77 126 
W
h
it
e
 m
e
a
t 
/
 
p
o
u
lt
r
y
 a
n
d
 p
o
r
k
 GTAP OMT: 
other meat 
49 59207 77 183 
from Asean 
(fasean)/ to EU 
from Mercosur / 
to EU 
from EU / to 
Japan (tJpn) 
Magnet 
POUM: 
poultry 
meat 
13 14469 76 137 
Magnet 
OMT: other 
white meat 
36 44738 77 166 
d
a
ir
y
 
GTAP MIL: 
dairy 
24 46402 77 180 
from NewZealand 
/ to EU 
from EU / to 
Asean 
from EU / to 
Japan (tJpn) 
Note: period 2012-2015 is used in every sectoral sample. Mercosur include: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and 
Paraguay; Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) includes: Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore (Cambodia, Brunei and Laos, also members of ASEAN, are not 
in the NTM database); EU refers to EU-28;  
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Table 2: Trade value of extra-EU trade (%), mean 2014-2016. 
 
Cattle meat (CMT) Other white meat (OMT) Dairy (MIL) 
Imports to EU from 
  
Asean 0.17 30.48 0.12 
JPN 0.68 0.15 0.07 
Mercosur 42.01 43.05 0.05 
NZL 33.72 2.78 28.26 
Extra EU imports 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
CMT OMT MIL 
Exports from EU to 
  
Asean 5.85 6.18 9.62 
JPN 0.75 13.93 3.66 
Mercosur 0.16 0.30 0.44 
NZL 0.01 0.75 0.70 
Extra EU exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: own calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
 
3.2 Trade unit values 
Trade unit values are used as the dependent variable in our estimations. One main 
advantage of unit values in comparison with other prices datasets, like those based on 
consumer price data, is that they are available at a high sectoral disaggregation (HS 6-
digit), and are bilateral or exporter-importer specific. Besides, the original unit values 
dataset is obtained from international trade repositories, such as the United Nations 
International Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE), by simply dividing trade values 
over quantities. For the “Trade Unit Values Database”, this has been completed by 
Berthou and Emlinger (2011) that carried out further statistical refinements in order to 
improve the overall quality of data. Since April 2017, the “Trade Unit Values Database” 
has been made available by CEPII. Two datasets are offered; one with the trade units 
being valued in cost insurance freight (CIF) prices and one with trade unit values in free 
on board (FOB) prices. As in previous work by UNCTAD (2017) and Cadot and Gourdon 
(2016), we favour the use of CIF trade unit values. The CIF values are based on 
importers’ declarations (usually recognized as more accurate) and reflect all trade costs 
except tariffs and domestic taxes after the border. As such, they are expected to capture 
more of the NTM-related costs (UNCTAD, 2017, p.28). 
The trade unit values database is bilateral, that is, for each pair of reporter (importer)-
partner (exporter) combination, aggregated at HS 6-digit, for the period 2000-2016, and 
expressed in US Dollars per ton. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of trade unit values corresponding to the samples 
selected for estimation. An important issue is that despite the statistical refinements to 
build up the database, a large dispersion of data still persists. For instance, in the cattle 
meat sector, the mean unit value is 6,586.2 USD, with a median of 4,465.80 USD, and 
ranging from 38.2 to 311,423.3 USD. Observing the lower and upper 5% percentile still 
reveals an enormous dispersion. Inspecting the data within each HS 6-digit line reveals 
substantial dispersion of unit values (see online excel file, sheet UVDesc). The authors of 
the dataset perform several econometric tests to check if such dispersion is motivated by 
macroeconomic aggregates, such as distance, GDP per capita in both the source and 
destination countries, finding a significant and positive influence. This outcome also 
corroborates previous empirical work by Fontagné et al., (2008) who find that the price 
of varieties imported is positively related to the development level of the exporter, where 
the price is actually the trade unit value, development level is approximated by GDP per 
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capita of the exporter and variety is considered at HS 6-digit. These results are 
interpreted in the context of vertical differentiation “with economic development, as 
skills, capital intensity, research and development capacity and organizational capacities 
increase, countries climb the ladder of vertical differentiation between varieties of 
exported products”. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of unit values. 
Sector N mean min max p50 p5 p95 
CMT – beef 
 
34,028 6,586.2 38.2 311,423.3 4,465.8 645.1 19,300.0 
Magnet 
BFCMT – beef 
 
10,848 8,455.7 146.4 298,828.5 5,811.4 1,968.3 21,480.6 
Magnet CMT – 
beef 
 
23,180 5,711.3 38.2 311,423.3 3,256.8 564.8 17,991.4 
OMT – other 
white meat 
 
65,264 7,296.7 42.6 415,881.1 4,282.9 820.8 21,958.2 
Magnet OMT –
other white 
meat 
 
49,056 8,141.4 42.6 415,881.1 4,741.5 907.8 24,505.6 
Magnet POUM – 
poultry 
 
16,208 4,740.1 85.9 216,023.5 3,129.5 738.3 13,382.1 
MIL - milk 56,628 5,348.5 38.8 507,988.7 3,755.1 698.1 13,243.8 
        
Total 1,55,920 6,434.1 38.2 507,988.7 4,101.6 721.3 18,026.3 
Source: own calculations based on the Trade Unit Value Database. 
Notes: N is number of observations; p50: percentile 50 or median; p5: percentile 5; and p95: percentile 95. 
Available data for all reporters, partners, in years 2012 to 2015. More detailed description at HS 6-digit in the 
online file (sheet UVDesc). 
 
3.3 Non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
Since April 2017 UNCTAD made available a database on the inventory of NTMs, which 
puts together information for 57 reporters (including the EU as a single bloc), conducting 
the calculation of the number of measures applied, by HS 6-digit line, within each 4-digit 
NTM category (i.e. Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) classification). This database 
represents a substantial advantage with respect to previous NTM- UNCTAD Trade 
Analysis Information System (TRAINS) datasets (i.e. individual for each reporter, number 
of measures required own calculations, and less information, such as the type of 
coverage, was recorded). Details on the interpretation of the database are provided by 
UNCTAD (2017a). 
The original database is bilateral, indicating the number of measures that importer s 
applies to exporter r, in sector h (HS 6-digit), of type k (NTM category according to the 
MAST classification, and defined at four digits). Most measures apply to any partner 
country as origin (which is indicated by partner=WLD), but still there are some measures 
that can apply to specific partners. To build our database for estimation, we add up both 
when they co-exist in the same destination/sector/NTM category. 
The original database informs about the year of collection of the NTM data, that normally 
is specific for each reporter but not for any other dimension (sector or type of NTM). 
Besides, the starting and ending date of application is also recorded for measures within 
each NTM category by reporter/sector. Using both starting and ending date variables, we 
provide a temporal dimension to the data. That is, we build up a time series variable that 
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captures the number of measures in place in each year of our period of analysis, 2012-
2015. Empirical applications using UNCTAD NTMs data only use a cross section, 
corresponding to the year of data collection. The only exception, as far as the author 
knows, is UNCTAD (2017b), although details are not provided. Table 4 presents an 
overview of NTMs in our sectorial samples. 
Figure 1 depicts the regulatory intensity (number of measures) applied in the regions of 
interest. Japan stands out as the country whose trade of dairy and meats is more 
regulated, while Mercosur is the region amongst the ones selected with lower regulatory 
intensity. The EU occupies an intermediate position in meats (with fewer measures 
applied than Japan, Asean and New Zealand) and the second most regulated market 
after Japan in dairy. When considering only SPS measures, however, the EU is jointly 
with Japan amongst the regions with highest regulatory intensity. Although Mercosur is 
globally the least regulated area, in terms of TBT it poses higher restrictions than other 
regions, the EU in particular. 
16 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of NTMs in the samples used for estimation. 
 
% of observations with at least one NTM Number of NTMs (mean) 
Number of measures (mean) when 
applied 
 
All (excl.P) A: SPS B: TBT Non A nor B All (excl.P) A: SPS B: TBT Non A nor B All (excl.P) A: SPS B: TBT Non A nor B 
CMT–beef 88 86 82 47 20.25 15.1 3.94 1.21 23.05 17.5 4.81 2.57 
Magnet 
BFCMT–beef 
99 99 94 93 25.09 18.5 4.46 2.12 25.22 18.7 4.75 2.29 
Magnet CMT– 
beef 
82 80 76 26 17.99 13.5 3.70 0.78 21.82 16.8 4.84 3.03 
OMT– 
other white meat 
92 90 87 23 22.85 17.0 4.97 0.87 24.77 18.8 5.69 3.74 
Magnet OMT – 
other white meat 
74 73 68 16 19.36 14.8 3.64 0.93 26.06 20.2 5.34 5.66 
Magnet POUM– 
poultry 
98 96 93 25 24.01 17.76 5.40 0.85 24.44 18.4 5.78 3.33 
MIL-milk 94 92 87 76 27.55 19.41 5.99 2.14 29.41 21.1 6.90 2.82 
Total 92 90 86 47 23.99 17.47 5.12 1.40 26.13 19.4 5.95 2.95 
Source: own calculations based on UNCTAD NTMs database. 
Notes: Non A nor B categories also exclude P type (NTMs affecting exports). 
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Figure 1: Regulatory Intensity (average number of measures) for selected sectors and regions 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD NTMs database 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD NTMs database 
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Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD NTMs database 
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4 Method: price approach to estimating AVEs of NTMs 
4.1 The theoretical price approach 
The theoretical basis for the price approach is explained in Cadot and Gourdon (2016), 
which in turn makes use of theoretical developments by Melitz (2003). The empirical 
price equation is consistent with a standard monopolistic-competition theoretical model 
with heterogeneous firms, expressed as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑠ℎ
𝐶𝐼𝐹 = 𝑀𝑟
1
1−𝜎 ∙ 𝜏𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙ (
𝜎
𝜎−1
) ∙
𝑤𝑟
𝜑𝑟
          (1) 
where sub-indexes r, s and h, refer to the exporter, importer and sector, respectively; P 
is price that is valued in CIF (cost insurance freight) prices and specific to each 
destination country as it includes trade costs (other than tariffs); Mr is the mass of firms 
producing product h in origin country r; σ the elasticity of substitution between varieties 
(i.e. countries); 𝜏𝑟𝑠ℎ is the ad-valorem trade cost (iceberg-type); wr is a marginal cost 
reflecting supply conditions in the exporting country r, such as the wage rate; and 𝜑𝑟 is a 
productivity aggregator (i.e. an integral over the unconditional distribution of firm 
productivities) (Melitz, 2003, eq.7). 
Empirically, the price is the trade unit value observed in the database, and the ad-
valorem trade cost is decomposed into transport costs, which are approximated by 
distance and other geographical and cultural variables (e.g. contiguity, common 
language, colonial linkage) and subsumed in matrix 𝒙𝑟𝑠, as well as ad-valorem tariffs 
(𝑡𝑟𝑠ℎ) and non-tariff measures (𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ): 
𝜏𝑟𝑠ℎ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛾 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ + 𝛿 ∙ ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑠ℎ) +  𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝑟𝑠 ]       (2) 
Strictly speaking the definition of CIF prices exclude tariffs, which is highlighted by 
Beghin and Xiong (2016, p.23) that point out this inconsistency in the empirical 
formulation and application by Cadot and Gourdon (2016). Nevertheless, the rationale 
behind the inclusion of tariffs, or NTMs for that matter, in equation (2) is that the cost 
incurred by producers and induced by tariffs and non-tariff measures is passed on to the 
final consumer in the importing country through higher CIF prices (Gourdon, et al., 2018, 
p.23), with the nuance that, for NTMs “only the cost-fraction that is passed-through can 
be observed” (Cadot and Gourdon, 2014, p.443). The degree of pass-through, in turn, 
will depend on several observable and non-observable producer, industry and market 
characteristics (Cadot et al, 2018, p.28). For example, under WTO rules, SPS and TBT 
measures are non-discriminatory and accordingly, both domestic and imported products 
will face a cost rise due to compliance costs with regulations and standards (Cadot et al., 
2018, p.28). 
4.2 The empirical specification of the price model 
The final price-approach empirical model then becomes (after linearization by taking logs 
of the multiplicative form in (1) and replacing the theoretical variables by their empirical 
counterparts: 
uv𝑟𝑠ℎ =  𝛽0 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ + 𝛿 ∙ ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑠ℎ) + 𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝑟𝑠 + 𝑢𝑟𝑠ℎ    (3) 
where uv𝑟𝑠ℎ is the log of the unit value (CIF); β0, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are parameters to estimate; 𝜷 is 
a vector of parameters to estimate; and 𝑢𝑟𝑠ℎ is the error term. NTM refers to the variable 
accounting for NTMs, and that can be defined in different ways (see below): 𝒙 are other 
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explanatory variables, such as distance, GDP, etc... To this specification, we add the time 
series dimension (t), as we have built up a panel for the period 2012-2015.  
Non-tariff measures are specified in two different ways: i) as Regulatory Intensity (RI); 
and ii) as a dummy indicator (d). RI is calculated as the number of measures faced by 
exporter r when exporting the product h, to destination s, in year t (excluding those of 
type P that refer to measures imposed by the destination country to its own exports). 
The dummy indicator, on the other hand, simply captures the presence or absence of any 
non-tariff measure, of any type (excluding P) in the route from r to s, in sector h and 
year t. 
Most of the applications use an NTM dummy indicator, while more recent literature like 
Murina and Nicita (2017) and UNCTAD (2017b) use the number of measures instead. We 
call this continuous variable Regulatory Intensity (RI). Note, that, the more complete the 
NTMs databases become, the more difficult is to find sectors and/or routes where no 
NTMs are applied, and accordingly, the frequency ratios become close to 100%, turning 
the dummy approach infeasible or at least challenging (Table 4). 
The alternative definitions have consequences on the interpretation of the accompanying 
coefficients: 
AVE using RI: The coefficient γ measures the percent change in the trade unit value 
when the Regulatory Intensity increases in one additional measure (this interpretation as 
a semi-elasticity applies because RI is a non-logged continuous variable and the 
dependent variable is in logs)1. This can be interpreted then, directly, as the Ad-Valorem 
Equivalent of one additional non-tariff measure. Note that as the coefficient γ is the 
marginal effect, it makes more sense to interpret the impact on prices around the 
average number of non-tariff measures (UNCTAD, 2017b, p.30). 
Note also that one additional measure may be very little, compared to the average 
number of measures, and accordingly, the coefficient itself may not be very informative 
about the actual AVE faced when exporting to a typical destination with mean regulatory 
intensity2. Accordingly, the final AVE (we call it Gross AVE by comparison to the 
coefficient estimate to which we will refer to as Marginal AVE) is obtained by multiplying 
the coefficient by the average number of measures applied, either in the sample, to 
obtain a general number, or in specific routes. More formally: 
Marginal AVE using RI (%) = γ∙100 
Gross AVE using RI (%) = 𝛾 ∙ 𝑅𝐼̅̅ ̅ ∙ 100 
where RI̅ is the average number of measures in the sample. 
AVE using dNTM (dummy for NTM): Changing from absence of NTMs (dNTM=0) to the 
presence of at least 1 NTM (dNTM= 1) changes prices by [exp(γ)-1] ∙100 %. 
To further investigate the specific impact of NTMs on trade unit values by route, we have 
followed two alternative approaches: i) extending the specification (3) to accommodate 
the interactions between the routes presented in Table 1 and the NTM variable 
(Regulatory Intensity or presence/absence indicator) – Interaction approach-; and ii) 
extending the specification (3) by an additional variable that captures country-specific 
characteristics, which we refer to as the characteristics approach. 
                                           
1 The Regulatory Intensity could also be measured as ln(1+RI) (as in Murina and Nicita, 
2017) and in which case, the coefficient would measure the elasticity or percent change 
in the trade unit value following a 1% change in RI. Nevertheless, we think that the 
definition of Ad-Valorem Equivalent matches better the concept of marginal effect than 
the elasticity. 
2 This qualification is based on the fact that coefficients are scale dependent (for 
instance, dividing RI by 10 would multiply the coefficient by 10) (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010, p.88, p.345). 
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Route interaction approach 
In contrast with the characteristics approach (see below) the interaction approach allows 
the estimation of a distinct marginal impact of NTMs depending on the trade flows route 
(i.e. one additional measure has a different impact on trade unit values when trade 
partners are in or outside the route), which will be evaluated statistically by the 
significance of the interaction term. 
For instance, to check if the impact of NTMs is significantly different in the route from 
Mercosur to the EU, equation (3) further incorporates the following bilateral interactions3: 
● NTM_fmerco = NTM × fmerco; it captures the number (RI) or presence 
(dNTM) of non-tariff measures faced by Mercosur members r when exporting 
to any destination; 0 otherwise 
● NTM_teu = NTM × teu; it captures the number (RI) or presence (dNTM) of 
non-tariff measures imposed by the EU to any exporter; 0 otherwise 
● NTM_fmerco_teu = NTM × fmerco × teu ; it captures the number (RI) or 
presence (dNTM) of non-tariff measures faced by Mercosur members r when 
exporting to the EU; 0 otherwise 
Thus, a significant coefficient of NTM_teu means that the measures imposed by the EU 
affect prices differently than other destinations, while the sign will indicate if the effect on 
prices is larger (positive) or lesser (negative) than the measures imposed by other 
destinations4. 
Generally speaking, the model specification in (3) is augmented as follows: 
𝑢𝑣𝑟𝑠ℎ =  𝛽0 + 𝛾0 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ + 𝛾𝑅 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙ 𝑓𝑅 + 𝛾𝑆 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙ 𝑡𝑆 + 
 𝛾𝑅𝑆 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙ 𝑓𝑅 ∙ 𝑡𝑆 + 𝛿 ∙ ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑠ℎ) +  𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝑟𝑠 + 𝑢𝑟𝑠ℎ     (4) 
where R and S sub-indexes refer to the origin and destination regions/countries in the 
route, respectively (e.g. R = Mercosur; S = EU); f (from) and s (to) are dummy variables 
for the origin (from) and destination regions in the route, respectively (e.g. fR = fmerco; 
tS = tEU); βi and γi (i=R, S, RS) are parameters to estimate. 
The marginal AVE in the specific route of interest, depending on the way the NTM 
variable is introduced in the model, is calculated as 5: 
Regulatory Intensity –RI: 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑓𝑅_𝑡𝑆 = (𝛾𝑅 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝛾𝑅𝑆) ∙ 100     (5) 
Presence NTM – dNTM: 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑓𝑅_𝑡𝑆 = [exp (𝛾𝑅 + 𝛾𝑆 + 𝛾𝑅𝑆)-1] ∙ 100  
The characteristics approach 
                                           
3 The full set of interactions is easily done in STATA using the factor interactions. For 
instance: c.RI#i.fmerco#i.teu or i.dNTM#i.fmerco#i.teu. Including two #, main effects 
for each of the variables in the interactions are also included. 
4 Using the automatic interactions as explained in footnote 3, however, the estimated 
coefficients for the interaction do not represent the differential impact with respect to the 
base level but rather the final impact.  
5 The STATA command margins is used for this purpose which also provides standard 
errors and confidence intervals for the resulting AVE; the margins command requires the 
definition of factor interactions as presented in footnote 3. 
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The characteristics approach was initially employed by Kee et al. (2009) and more 
recently by Gourdon, Cadot and Van Tongeren (2018). The final goal is to estimate a 
country-specific NTMs AVE. Ideally, following the same line of thought as in the previous 
approach, a country-specific AVE could be obtained by interacting the NTM variable with 
the country destination fixed effect (i.e. a specific constant for each importer). However, 
the degrees of freedom drop sharply compromising the quality of the estimation. For 
instance, with our database, 75-77 different NTM coefficients would be estimated, that 
could further multiply by 3 if NTMs were to split by A, B and NonAB categories, as we 
also do later. 
Alternatively, the array of country specific interactions can be replaced by one single 
variable that measures some characteristic of the importer. Thus, Kee et al. (2009) used 
endowment factors variables and Gourdon et al., (2018) trade shares. Both studies 
estimate each HS 6-digit line separately, obtaining AVEs per sector chapter. Cadot et al. 
(2018, p.33) warns about this interpretation as country-AVE, when more accurately 
speaking, it is the AVE at some specific value of trade share. Likewise, the marginal 
effect of NTMs is constant across countries, with the only nuance introduced by the 
coefficient accompanying the NTM-trade share interaction. 
Formally, equation (3) becomes6: 
𝑢𝑣𝑟𝑠ℎ =  (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑠ℎ + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑟ℎ) + (𝛾0 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙  𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑠ℎ 
+𝛾2 ∙ 𝑁𝑇𝑀𝑟𝑠ℎ ∙  𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑟ℎ) + 𝛿 ∙ ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑠ℎ) + 𝜷 ∙ 𝒙𝑟𝑠 + 𝑢𝑟𝑠ℎ     (6) 
where TShih (i=r,s) is the share in world imports of importer s (exporter r) in sector h. 
Thus, for instance, a positive and significant 𝛾1 implies that, the larger the world import 
share of the importer, the bigger will be the price rising impact of and additional NTM 
(when using regulatory intensity) or of the presence of any NTM (when a dummy is 
used). 
In this approach, a country specific AVE for each importer s is obtained by evaluating the 
trade share variable at the corresponding mean value for the importer s (keeping the 
trade share for the exporter at the sample mean)7: 
Regulatory Intensity–RI: 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑠 = (𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑟ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ∙ 100    (7) 
Presence NTM – dNTM: 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑠 = [𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑟ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )-1] ∙ 100  
By evaluating the above expressions at the mean trade shares of the exporters and 
importers in the route of interest, we can then get an alternative measure of the bilateral 
route AVE. While the characteristic approach is more parsimonious in parameters, for the 
specific case of bilateral routes the calculations are a bit more complex as a previous 
calculation of average trade shares is needed. On the other hand, however, each specific 
bilateral route can be evaluated in a common model by simply changing the values of 
these average trade shares, with together with the restriction of a single marginal effect 
of NTMs may provide more economically consistent results. This is, anyway, an empirical 
question. 
 
                                           
6 The interactions are automatically included in the specification using factor variables: 
c.RI##c.TSh or i.dNTM##c.TSh. 
7 The margins command allows the evaluation of the marginal effect at specific values of 
the explanatory variables and is used for this calculation. 
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5 Empirical application 
5.1 General model specification  
The model in (3) is estimated for each sectoral sub-sample, corresponding to GTAP 
sectors “Cattle meat” (CMT), “Other meat” (OMT) and “Dairy” (MIL), and the subdivisions 
in MAGNET: “Beef meat” (Magnet BFCMT) and “Other cattle meat” (Magnet CMT); and 
“Poultry meat” (Magnet POUM) and “Other white meat” (Magnet OMT). 
The regression models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as after taking 
logs, the model becomes linear.  
In the estimation, further controls are introduced in the empirical model (3). Some of the 
explanatory variables are the traditional gravity core variables to better proxy transport 
costs. These are bilateral distance, common language and colonial linkage dummies, 
taken from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Likewise, the size of the economies is 
controlled with GDPs (in particular, product of GDPs in the importer and exporter, in 
logs), taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). We would expect a positive 
impact of distance on trade prices, as further distance implies a higher transport cost and 
therefore a higher CIF price, ceteris paribus. Sharing a border, language or a past 
colonial relationship is expected to reduce trade costs and consequently trade unit 
values. The impact of the product of GDP in a traditional gravity equation is positive and 
close to one, as the GDP is a proxy for the exporter supply and the importer demand. In 
the price-specification, we could also expect a positive impact as supported by Fontagné 
et al. (2008).  
Additionally, we control for bilateral trade policies by introducing a dummy variable to 
account for the existence of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) amongst trade partners 
and tariffs. RTAs data is taken from Mario Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements Database 
(Egger and Larch, 2008, updated in 2014). As far as members of RTA benefit from 
preferential market access, including a reduction or elimination of tariffs, we could expect 
a price decreasing impact. Bilateral tariffs (t) come from UNCTAD TRAINS accessed 
through the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) portal. These are applied simple 
tariff line averages, including ad-valorem equivalents for specific duties as calculated by 
UNCTAD. In order to keep EU countries as individual identities, the observations for intra-
EU trade are assigned a null tariff. Missing tariffs for specific years are replaced by the 
latest available tariff for the same route-HS6 sector. Finally, unilateral tariffs are 
assigned to each partner, unless a bilateral tariff exists. Tariffs are included in the usual 
form (i.e. power of the tariff: ln(1+t)) and a positive impact is expected. The definition of 
CIF price excludes tariffs, and Beghin and Xiong (2016, p.23) warns against its inclusion 
in a CIF price dependent model. However, it could also be argued that the increasing 
costs faced by foreign producers to access the destination markets derived from tariffs 
are likely to be passed through to the final consumer in the destination market. A similar 
argument is used for the case of NTMs by Gourdon at al., (2018, p.23). Nevertheless, as 
a robustness check, we also conduct the estimation dropping the tariff variable. 
Further controls encompass country (exporter and importer) fixed effects to account for 
any non-observed influence that is constant along time and across sectors and specific to 
each country (e.g., infrastructure, industry structure, factor endowments, country 
productivity). Individual HS 6-digit sector fixed effects are included to account for 
specificities of sectors, in particular, in relation to the application of non-tariff measures, 
were some HS 6-digit lines are more prone to apply a bigger number of measures. 
Finally, year fixed effects allow controlling for any macroeconomic conditions common to 
all countries but that vary along time, including a possible common trend to increase the 
number of regulations. Summing up, in order to isolate or identify the impact of NTMs on 
bilateral trade unit values, we control for bilateral influences captured by the traditional 
geographical, cultural and historical variables, unilateral influences regarding the size of 
the economies (GDPs) as well as sectoral and time unobserved effects. 
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Standard errors are robust for exporter-importer clustering in order to account for intra-
cluster correlation not sufficiently controlled for with observed variables, as it is the usual 
practice (Yotov et al., 2016). 
5.2 Baseline model general results 
The models estimation results are not included in the report for space saving reasons but 
are provided in an ancillary online excel file (OnlineTables). In the excel file, the tables 
are numbered the same way they are referenced to in the text. Thus, the estimation 
results for each sectorial subsample using RI are included in a separate table: CMT in 
Table 1; Magnet BFCMT in Table 2; Magnet CMT in Table 3; OMT in Table 4; Magnet 
POUM in Table 5; Magnet OMT in Table 6; and MIL in Table 7 (sheet TableModels). When 
the NTM indicator is used instead, corresponding tables are from Table 1.1 to Table 7.1. 
(sheet TablesModelsDummies). The first column in each of these tables presents 
estimation results for the baseline model, that is, a specification where the NTM variable 
is not interacted with any route. The last three columns include results for the regression 
that includes each of the three routes considered in each sector (route-interaction 
approach). Tables 1 to 7 and Tables 1.1 to 7.1 include results for 56 estimated models. 
Fixed effects are hidden to ease the reading of tables. 
We describe the general direction of influence of the different explanatory variables but 
do not dig into the theoretical interpretation of the relations found beyond the description 
of the expected signs of the influence overviewed in the previous section. While the 
theoretical arguments that support the expected results in a standard gravity estimation 
of the quantity effect are well established and empirical exercises have found enough 
support, the literature on the econometric price approach is very scarce and does not 
provide enough arguments for explaining/justifying the expectation of the direction of the 
effects. 
Results of Tables 1 to 7 using the RI variable report a good fit of the models, with R2 of 
around 0.66 in cattle meat, 0.46 in white meat, 0.55 in poultry meat, and 0.50 in dairy. 
Corresponding R2 in the dummy specification are extremely similar.  
The tariff impact is highly consistent across specifications of the NTM variable. A price 
rising effect of tariffs is found in every single model (with only one exception with the RI 
specification, but the coefficient is insignificant). The impact is slightly higher in red 
meats (BFCMT, 0.09; CMT, 0.07), followed by dairy (0.05), and being the lowest in white 
meats (OMT and Magnet OMT around 0.03). In other words, an increase of the power of 
the tariff by 10% in CMT, for instance, will translate into an increase of the trade unit 
value by 0.7%. Nevertheless, in order to have a more accurate estimate of the tariff 
pass-through to trade prices, it would be necessary further checking of endogeneity. 
The variable rta is found to have a negative and significant effect on trade unit values in 
white meat, and a positive albeit not often significant in the cattle meat and dairy 
sectors. This pattern is common to both NTM specifications, no matter whether in terms 
of the Regulatory Intensity or Presence/Absence (dummy) indicator. Further investigation 
would be required to understand if the distinct results across sectors are actually 
supported by other empirical evidence and by sector specific casuistic, or are just a result 
of the model specification, where, amongst other things, endogeneity could be an issue. 
Bilateral distance between trade partners has an unambiguously positive and significant 
effect on trade unit values, with elasticities in the range of 0.11-0.13. In other words, a 
pair of countries with a distance 1% larger than any other pair suffers an increase in their 
trade price of 0.11-0.13%, other things equal. Contiguity, however, contributes to 
mitigate this effect, with a negative impact on trade prices that range between 0.05-
0.10, which is also predominantly significant. In other words, a pair of contiguous 
countries reduce their bilateral trade price by 5 –10 % (i.e. [exp(0.05)-1]∙100) in 
comparison to non-contiguous countries, ceteris paribus. Again, not only the direction of 
influence but also the magnitudes of the effects are robust against alternative 
specifications of the NTM variable. 
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Sharing a common language or having a common past colonial linkage also increases 
significantly trade prices, which is a bit counter-intuitive, taking into account that 
language and historical connections are expected to reduce communication costs. The 
product of both partners GDPs also have a positive and significant impact on trade unit 
values, with elasticities around 0.3 that is also robust for alternative NTMs specifications. 
Changing the product of GDPs by the specific origin and destination countries GDPs does 
not alter the sign and magnitudes. Thus, the elasticity of trade prices with respect to GDP 
in the origin and destination country is 0.24 and 0.31, respectively. Using GDPs per 
capita instead lead to very close results (with positive elasticities with respect to GDP per 
capita in the origin and destination countries of respectively 0.21 and 0.28). 
5.3 The general price impact of NTMs 
We analyse first results on the Regulatory Intensity without segmenting by types of NTMs 
(Table 1 to 7 in ancillary online file). RI shows in general a positive and highly significant 
impact on trade unit values. Only in the subsector poultry meat, we fail to find such a 
linkage. Without going into detail, the estimation results reveal a larger price-rising effect 
of NTMs for cattle meat (0.008), followed by white meat (around 0.005), and being the 
smallest in dairy (around 0.002). The magnitude of the coefficients on the RI variable 
seems to be rather low. Thus, increasing by one the average number of measures 
applied by any importer to any exporter in any of the subsectors included in cattle meat, 
increases trade unit value by 0.8%. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the impact is 
“small” or “smaller” than other variables, as the coefficients are dependent on the 
measurement scale (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.88). Thus, adjusting this unit-increase 
by the average number of measures applied in the sample (20.25 in CMT) leads to an 
AVE of 16%. A similar approach is followed by UNCTAD (2017b, p.30). Sheet AVE_RI in 
the online file shows these calculations and Table 5 in the report presents main results. 
Table 5: General AVEs without segmenting by NTM category (measures under chapter P are 
excluded).  
 
NTM Regulatory Intensity (RI) 
(4) 
NTM Presence Indicator 
(dNTM) (%) Sector 
(1) 
Marginal AVE 
(2) 
Mean 
RI 
(3) = (1) x(2) 
Gross AVE (%) 
CMT 0.008*** 20.25 16% 61%*** 
Magnet BFCMT 0.010*** 25.09 24% 21%** 
MagnetCMT 0.006*** 17.99 12% 76%*** 
OMT 0.005*** 22.85 12% -5% 
MagnetPOUM -0.003 19.36 -6% -22%** 
MagnetOMT 0.005*** 24.01 13% -2% 
MIL 0.002*** 27.55 6% -2% 
Notes: ***, ** and * mean significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Standard errors calculated with the Delta 
method. (1) is the estimated coefficient for RI in Tables 1 to 7 (online file); (2) is the mean of RI in the 
sample used for estimation; (4) is [exp(γ)-1]*100 where γ is the estimated coefficient for the dNTM 
variable in Tables 1.1-1.7 (online file). 
It should be noted that these magnitudes are robust to alternative specifications8, such 
as (i) excluding extremes in the distribution of unit values. In fact, the RI impact tends to 
be lower when 10% of extreme values are eliminated (see Table 3 for basic statistic 
description of unit values); (ii) excluding core gravity variables – distance, colony, 
                                           
8 The alternative specifications with non-segmented NTMs have only been tried in the 
CMT sector, and the results reported circumscribe to said sector. Further robustness 
checks are conducted in the models with segmented NTMs. 
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language- or tariffs (the magnitude remains practically unaltered); (iii) including a 
quadratic term for RI to allow for a non-linear impact of additional non-tariff measures. 
Interestingly the magnitude of the RI increases considerably (by a factor 3), what 
indicates a substantial bigger effect of one additional measure, while the coefficient of 
the quadratic terms is negative, mitigating the impact for larger number of measures. 
The combined effect of both leads to an overall mean effect on price of practically the 
same magnitude as the one reported in Table 5. 
Turning to the specifications of NTMs as dummy variables, we also find a positive and 
significant impact on trade unit values in cattle meat sectors, see Tables 1.1. to 7.1. in 
the online file. The impact in white meats and dairy, however, is found negative albeit 
not significant. Therefore, the conclusion on the overall impact of NTMs over trade prices 
depends crucially on the NTM variable definition. Besides, also in contrast with the RI 
results, the magnitude of the impact is much bigger when using an indicator for the 
presence of NTMs. Thus, for instance, moving from absence to presence of at least one 
non-tariff measure, increases the trade unit value by 61% in the cattle meat sector 
([exp(0.475)-1]×100). 
Comparing across NTM variable specifications, the RI provides more plausible results 
than the dummy approach, which could be ascribed to the scarce variability of the latter 
and the consequent difficulty to isolate its impact. 
 
5.4 Price impact of different categories of NTMs 
The models with segmentation by type of NTM are presented in Tables 8-14 in the online 
accompanying excel file (sheet TablesModels), a table per sector. The first column in 
each table shows the specification without any route interaction, and we call this the 
benchmark model. NTMs are split into three categories: type A being SPS measures; type 
B being TBT measures; and NonAB, which excludes categories P, A and B. Therefore, in 
each estimated model, a specific coefficient is estimated for each of these categories. The 
segmentation is carried out with the Regulatory Intensity variable.  
The overall fit of the models practically remains unaltered and the coefficient of the core 
gravity variables maintain the direction of influence and exhibit magnitudes close to 
those in the non-segmented NTM models presented in Table 1-7 in the online tables file. 
The RI of the three different categories show the expected positive sign in most of the 
regressions, while being significant only in a subset of those. A significant positive impact 
on prices is found for SPS measures in CMT, and BFCMT; OMT; and MIL. TBT measures 
are also found to raise prices in CMT (both GTAP and Magnet). A counter-intuitive 
negative and significant effect is found in POUM. Finally, measures different from SPS 
and TBT affect positive and significantly prices in OMT (both GTAP and Magnet). 
5.4.1 Robustness checks of the estimations 
We conduct a series of robustness checks to compare the coefficients of segmented 
Regulatory Intensity by type of measure across alternative specifications with the 
benchmark model (results are shown in Tables 15-21 in the ancillary online file (sheet 
TablesModelsRobustness). 
First, one year lagged regulatory intensity is used instead of the contemporaneous RI. 
This approach is also used to better control for possible endogeneity issues as while the 
lagged number of standards is correlated with current standards, current trade cannot 
influence the past regulation (Ferro et al., 2015). In general, the direction of influence 
and significance is preserved, while there are minor changes in the magnitudes of the 
impacts. Only in the POUM and OMT sectors in the Magnet model, we observe that SPS 
measures become significant when using lagged regulatory intensity. 
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Second, the regulatory intensity in destination country s is replaced by the average 
number of measures imposed by a reference group to which country s belongs. In 
particular, we use the Tariff Analytical and Simulation Tool for Economists (TASTE) GTAP 
Reference Groups (MAcMapHS6v2) defined to reduce endogeneity when aggregating and 
computing AVE of different tariffs (Horridge and Laborde, 2008). Again, this is a way of 
controlling for endogeneity of NTMs and the subsequent consequences on the consistency 
of parameters. Minor changes occur in the magnitudes of the impact of RI when using 
the average number of the reference group instead of the RI applied by the destination 
country. However, changes in the statistical significance are observed in six out of the 21 
coefficients (7 sectors x 3 coefficients on NTMs RI). Thus, SPS measures seem to lose 
(gain) significance in BFCMT (MagnetCMT, POUM), and TBT measures seem to lose (gain) 
significance in CMT (BFCMT, MagnetCMT). 
Third, extreme values of the unit values distribution are trimmed out, in particular, the 
lowest and upper 5-percentiles are removed to avoid the influence of very extreme 
values (Table 3). The direction, significance and magnitudes of relevant coefficients 
remain practically unchanged after removing extreme values. 
Fourth, the group of exporters is limited to those that, in every GTAP sector, account for 
99% of trade in the sample, extended to include the countries/regions of interest for this 
study. Thus, the original number of exporters reported in Table 1, 144, 183 and 180 in 
CMT, OMT and MIL, respectively, fall to 79, 86 and 85. As in the case of removing 
extreme unit values, the direction, significance and the magnitude, in particular of the 
significant coefficients on Regulatory Intensity, remain very close to those of the 
benchmark model. 
Finally, the set of country fixed effects is replaced by country-pairs fixed effects, to better 
account for endogeneity of bilateral trade policies (Yotov et al., 2016), such as tariffs, 
regional trade agreements, and NTMs. Bilateral variables that do not change along time 
are dropped to avoid multi-collinearity with the pair fixed effects. This specification 
preserves the direction of influence, and minor changes occur in significance (one out of 
the 21 coefficients) and magnitudes. 
5.4.2 General observations 
After asserting that alternative specifications hardly alter the implications on the impact 
of regulatory intensity of SPS, TBT and other NTMs on trade unit values, we calculate Ad-
Valorem Equivalents for each of these categories of NTMs using the coefficients in the 
benchmark model (first column in Tables 10-14 or Tables 15-21 in the online file). 
Results are summarized in Table 6. For comparison, we also keep the Gross AVE reported 
in Table 5. The gross AVE calculated by adding up only significant AVEs per category is 
shown in the penultimate column in Table 6. Finally, to put the AVE estimates for NTMs 
into context, the last column in Table 6 includes the average tariff in the sample. 
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Table 6: AVEs by NTM category (Regulatory Intensity) 
 A: SPS B: TBT NonAB 
A+B+NonAB 
(sig) 
NonP 
 
Tariff 
Sector 
(1) 
Marginal 
AVE 
(2) 
Mean 
RI 
(3) = (1) 
x(2) 
Gross 
AVE (%) 
(1) 
Marginal 
AVE 
(2) 
Mean 
RI 
(3) = (1) 
x(2) 
Gross 
AVE (%) 
(1) 
Marginal 
AVE 
(2) 
Mean 
RI 
(3) = 
(1) x(2) 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
(4) 
Gross AVE 
(%) 
(5) 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
(6) 
CMT 0.005*** 15.10 7.9% 0.021*** 3.94 8.3% 0.002 1.21 0.2% 16.1% 16% 8.2% 
Magnet BFCMT 0.009*** 18.50 17.2% 0.011 4.46 4.8% 0.014 2.12 2.9% 17.2% 24% 12.9% 
MagnetCMT 0.002 13.51 3.3% 0.027*** 3.70 9.9% -0.010 0.78 -0.8% 9.9% 12% 5.8% 
OMT 0.003*** 17.02 5.5% 0.002 4.97 1.2% 0.067*** 0.87 5.8% 11.3% 12% 5.1% 
MagnetPOUM 0.003 14.79 4.1% -0.038** 3.64 -14.0% 0.017 0.93 1.5% -14.0% -6% 5.0% 
MagnetOMT 0.003 17.76 5.7% 0.002 5.40 0.8% 0.079*** 0.85 6.7% 6.7% 13% 5.2% 
MIL 0.004*** 19.41 7.1% -0.001 5.99 -0.8% -0.003 2.14 -0.7% 7.1% 6% 7.8% 
Notes: ***, ** and * mean significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Significant AVEs highlighted in bold. (1) is the estimated coefficient for RI in the benchmark model, 
shown in first column of Tables 10(15) to 14(21); (2) is the mean of RI in the sample used for estimation; (4) Global AVE obtained by adding up significant AVEs by 
category; (5) Calculations on non-segmented NTM baseline model as in Table 5; (6) Average tariff in the sample. 
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With only one exception, AVEs have the correct positive sign; the more aggregated 
sectors show more significant AVEs; the general AVE calculated in the baseline model 
where NTMs are not segmented by categories practically coincides with the sum of the 
AVEs calculated for each of the three broad categories. Accordingly, the marginal effects 
for different types of measures are additive, and the procedure to calculate Gross AVEs 
provides coherent results. Splitting by type of NTM, however, allows checking for 
individual statistical influence. Adding up only the significant AVEs by type of NTM, leads 
in general to lower figures than that one obtained without differentiating by type of 
measures. In other words, by not segmenting the impact of NTMs by categories we may 
easily end up overestimating the trade cost of NTMs. Finally, although in general the 
estimated AVEs for NTMs are larger than tariffs, they are of the same order of magnitude 
and never exceed as much as twice the tariffs.  
The cost impact of SPS, TBT and other types of measures is sector specific, but while TBT 
affect meat sectors (to different degrees) dairy is significantly affected only by SPS 
measures. Gourdon, Cadot and van Tongeren (2018, p.28) report AVEs of 16%, 48% and 
28%, for CMT, OMT and MIL, respectively, and in CMT and MIL, the TBT AVE is higher 
than SPS. Therefore, our AVE estimate for CMT is identical, while for OMT and MIL our 
estimates are significantly lower. Straight comparisons with other strands of the 
literature are not easy, mainly because of different sector and NTMs aggregation (and 
sources) as well as methodological approaches. Two studies, however, provide results 
that at least from a sectoral point of view, are more comparable. These are Sanjuán et 
al.(2017), who calculate overall trade costs due to any NTM (24%, 16% and 23%, for 
CMT, OMT and MIL, respectively); and Kee et al.(2009) who provide individual estimates 
per country/HS 6-digit sector for technical NTMs, and averaging for the GTAP sectors 
used here lead to 42%, 26% and 51%. Therefore, our estimates move in the range 
found in the literature, but different studies do not even agree on which sector has more 
costly NTMs. 
 
5.5 Bilateral price impact of NTMs: interaction approach 
Over the baseline model presented in section 5.3 and using the Regulatory Intensity 
variable we run two sets of modifications: first, the inclusion of specific routes as detailed 
in Table 1; and second, the segmentation of the NTM variable into SPS measures (type 
A), TBT (type B) and the remaining (excluding P) interacted with the routes.  
The estimation results with route interactions are shown in the last three columns of 
Table 1-Table 7 for general NTMs, and Tables 8-14 segmenting by type of NTM in the 
online excel file.  
We have used a factor notation in the definition of interactions (i.e. c.RI#i.fmerco#i.teu), 
and we keep this notation in the tables. Note that this has a change in interpretation with 
respect to that elaborated in Section 4.2, as with the factor notation, the coefficient on 
the interaction between RI and the bilateral route is directly the marginal effect on that 
route (not the additional effect over the mean), while the coefficient on RI is the marginal 
effect at the base levels (e.g. trade not from Mercosur and not to the EU instead of the 
overall mean). 
The AVEs for NTMs in each bilateral route are presented in Table 7. The marginal effect is 
converted into the gross effect by multiplying by the number of measures, on average, 
faced by the exporters when trading with the importers, both within the bilateral route 
defined. For contextualizing the restrictiveness of the NTMs we also report average tariffs 
in the route. 
The main results of the bilateral AVEs for NTMs in general can be summarized as follows: 
First, the AVEs for NTMs estimated for specific bilateral routes are always cost rising, if 
significant. This is a good result indicating the economic coherence of the estimation 
approach. 
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Second, the AVEs for NTMs imposed on trade flows in the routes selected are higher 
(when significant) than those estimated on average for the full sample. For instance, 
AVEs with the EU as destination country are 47-61% for beef (CMT) and 38% for other 
meat (OMT), while average AVEs in the sample are 16% and 12%, in CMT and OMT, 
respectively. Again, this can be viewed as being economically consistent result since 
most of the destination countries under review are highly developed countries (e.g. EU, 
Japan) where NTMs tend to be more complex and extensive, while in the full sample, an 
array of countries a different economic development stages is contemplated. 
Third, only around 57% of the estimated bilateral AVEs are found statistically significant. 
This raises an important issue about the differentiated effect for different exporters: in 
the same destination country, null and non-null AVE values can coexist depending on the 
origin of the product. It is not unexpected that identical measures lead to different 
compliance costs for different exporters, and this is especially true when the exporters’ 
regulations are more similar (in terms of definition and scope) to those adopted by the 
importer. In this sense, future research could move into the definition and use of 
indicators of bilateral regulatory similarity or distance. In absence of further refinements 
in the model specification, however, it is difficult to defend, for instance, that Asean 
exporters do not face an extra cost when exporting other meat (OMT) products to the 
EU, while Mercosur exporters faces an AVE of 38%. 
Fourth, by narrowing the composition of the selected sector, the specific routes AVEs 
become, in some cases, more volatile. For instance, for cattle meat/beef (CMT) the AVE 
for NTMs in the route from EU to Asean is 0% but rise up to 171% in the different 
definition of the subsector, here for example beef meat (BFCMT). The cost impact of 
NTMs is captured by both, country and sector variability. By reducing the latter, 
depending on the distribution of the NTM variable across sectors, we are compromising 
the precision of the estimates.  
Keeping all that in mind, the results in Table 87 suggest that there is a distinctive impact 
in the routes from Mercosur to the EU and from New Zealand to the EU, in cattle meat 
and its two subsectors, where the second route faces a higher AVE for NTMs (namely 50-
61% versus 26-47%). From the perspective of Mercosur countries, the AVE for NTMs that 
the EU imposes on beef is higher than on other meats (47% for CMT versus 38% for 
OMT), while for certain sectoral splits, the direction is reversed (e.g. 26% in MagnetCMT 
versus 47% in MagnetOMT). In dairy, there is a substantial difference between the EU 
exporting dairy products to Asean countries or to Japan, where the former route 
indicated that the EU dairy exporters face an econometrically significant AVE of 12%. 
As a reminder, the numerical description above is based on Gross AVEs, and as such, 
represents both the unit cost per measure and the different pattern of regulatory 
intensity across routes and main destinations. Looking at the marginal AVEs, it is 
interesting to note that also significant differences are found across routes for the same 
sector. 
The results obtained by differentiating the measures according to categories, i.e. SPS, TBT and 
others, combined with the bilateral route definition are not satisfactory (last columns in Table 7). 
Some significant and negative influences are obtained; the range of marginal AVEs is very wide; 
and several values over 100% are encountered. This result is somehow astonishing as the NTM 
segmenting in the baseline model (
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Table 6) provided very consistent results with the non-segmented NTMs variable. 
Table 7: AVEs by NTM category and route (interaction approach). 
 NonP A: SPS B: TBT NonAB 
 
Tariff 
Sector 
Route 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
CMT              
From Merco / to EU 0.020*** 23.9 47% 0.030*** 18.3 56% -0.055 4.4 -24% 0.150*** 1.1 17% 49.2% 
From NZL / to EU 0.026*** 23.3 61% 0.037*** 18.4 68% -0.072*** 4.3 -31% 0.186*** 0.6 11% 51.2% 
From EU / to Asean -0.001 22.5 -3% -0.042*** 14.1 -59% 0.071*** 4.8 34% 0.071*** 3.5 25% 7.99 
Magnet BFCMT              
From Merco / to EU 0.017** 26.6 46% 0.017** 20.1 33% . 4.4 0% . 2.0 0% 64.1% 
From NZL / to EU 0.018*** 27.6 50% 0.026** 21.0 55% . 4.5 0% . 2.0 0% 74.5% 
From EU / to Asean 0.058*** 29.8 171% 0.025 17.0 43% 0.240*** 7.7 185% -0.008 5.0 -4% 4.8% 
MagnetCMT              
From Merco / to EU 0.013** 20.6 26% 0.048*** 16.1 78% -0.035 4.3 -15% 0.007 0.1 0% 29.6% 
From NZL / to EU 0.028*** 21.7 60% 0.058*** 17.4 101% -0.038** 4.2 -16% 0.145 0.1 1% 42.5% 
From EU / to Asean 0.000 20.7 1% -0.049*** 13.4 -66% 0.083*** 4.1 34% 0.130 3.1 41% 8.9% 
OMT              
From Asean / to EU -0.004 24.7 -10% -0.005 19.4 -9% -0.004 5.2 -2% 0.155 0.03 0% 27.7% 
From Mercosur / to EU 0.015*** 25.9 38% 0.072*** 20.5 148% -0.220*** 5.0 -112% 0.123*** 0.2 3% 24.3% 
From EU / to Japan 0.008*** 12.9 10% -0.002 8.1 -1% 0.054*** 4.7 26% -0.105 0.03 0% 15.8% 
MagnetPOUM              
From Asean / to EU 0.002 18.8 4% 0.024 15.2 36% -0.070 3.6 -25% . 0 . 21.9% 
From Mercosur / to EU 0.001 25.5 3% 0.149*** 20.5 305% -0.651*** 4.9 -322% . 0 . 17.6% 
From EU / to Japan 0.006 7.9 5% -0.014 5.9 -8% 0.267 1.9 51% . 0 . 7.3% 
MagnetOMT              
From Asean / to EU -0.006 26.7 -17% -0.016 20.9 -33% 0.028 5.8 16% 0.246** 0.04 1% 29.0% 
From Mercosur / to EU 0.018*** 26.2 47% 0.076*** 20.5 156% -0.215*** 5.1 -111% 0.115*** 0.4 6% 28.2% 
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 NonP A: SPS B: TBT NonAB 
 
Tariff 
Sector 
Route 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE 
(%) 
              
From EU / to Japan 0.009*** 14.1 12% -0.003 8.6 -3% 0.056*** 5.4 31% -0.097 0.04 0% 16.8% 
MIL              
From NZL / to EU 0.001 30.5 3% -0.110*** 23.0 -253% 0.239** 5.8 139% 0.683*** 1.6 114% 47.0% 
From EU / to Asean 0.005** 21.6 12% 0.008 14.1 11% 0.002 5.0 1% 0.023 2.3 5% 8.5% 
From EU / to Japan 0.000 16.5 1% 0.002 8.1 1% 0.003 4.7 1% -0.006 0.03 0% 43.2% 
Notes: ***, ** and * mean significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Significant Gross AVEs shaded. (1) is the mean of RI within the route, and in the sample used 
for estimation; (2) Global AVE obtained by multiplying Marginal AVE and Mean RI; (6) Average tariff in the route. 
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5.6 Bilateral price impact of NTMs: characteristic approach 
The characteristic approach is conducted by expanding the baseline model discussed in 
section 5.3. to include two extra variables that account for the trade shares of the 
exporter (shyf) and importer (shyt), respectively. One model is estimated for each GTAP 
sector, and results of the estimation are shown in the online tables file (sheet 
TablesModel_shares).  
The interpretation of results is better attained by looking at the final AVEs estimated and 
presented in Table 8. The marginal effect of NTMs is calculated using the command 
margins in STATA. The coefficient he RI variable is the Average Marginal Effect, i.e. 
evaluating the marginal effect at the sample means of the variables shyf and shyt. The 
figures for specific routes use the mean values of trade shares for the exporters in the 
origin of the route (e.g. mean of shyf when exporter belongs to Mercosur) and 
destination of the route (e.g. mean of shyt when importer is an EU member). 
Table 8 shows some encouraging results: without differentiating by type of NTMs, the 
results of the coefficients of the RI variable are very close to those obtained in the model 
without the trade shares variable (third column in Table 5; penultimate column in 
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Table 6): 15, 11 and 6% (third column in Table 8) versus 16, 12 and 6%, in cattle 
meat/beef (CMT), other white meat (OMT) and dairy (MIL), respectively. The similarity 
remains when distinguishing between NTMS and introducing respective RI variable for 
SPS, TBT and other measurers. For instance, the AVE for SPS measures is 7, 4 and 8%, 
for cattle meat (CMT), other white meat (OMT) and dairy (MIL), respectively, versus 8, 5 
and 7% obtained with the benchmark model with only the differentiated RI variable. 
Besides, as already mentioned, the addition of AVEs for the three different categories 
leads to a general AVE for NTMs that is of similar magnitude to the one estimated in the 
baseline model with a RI variable for non-differentiated NTMs. Summing up, across 
sectors, CMT shows the highest AVE (15%), followed by OMT (11%), while MIL shows 
the lowest of the three considered sectors (6%). 
Where the trade-share approach really makes a difference is when calculating AVEs for 
specific routes. Thus, the economic interpretability of route-specific AVEs with the trade-
shares approach is not as challenging as the one of the route-interaction approach 
presented in section 5.5.  
The results in the second panel of Table 8 show values that are around the average estimated AVE, 
which otherwise is not surprising because a common model is used for the calculation. The 
difference of results can be considered to be caused by the specific values for the trade-share 
variables at which the AVE is computed. For instance, on average in the sample, the AVE for NonP 
NTMs is 15% in cattle meat (shyf=0.056 and shyt=0.036); for the three routes selected, the 
maximum AVE, 20%, is estimated for exports coming from New Zealand to the EU (shyf=0.264 
and shyt=0.032), followed by 17% in the route from Mercosur to EU (shyf=0.047 and 
shyt=0.032), and 16% in the route from the EU to Asean (shyf=0.036 and shyt=0.027). In the 
route-interaction approach, however, each route was dealt with in a separate model, and 
evaluating the marginal effect of the variable RI at the sample means lead to values, in general, 
different from the ones reported in 
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Table 6 estimated on the baseline model (i.e. without route interactions). As shown, the 
average impact seems to be crucially affected by the model specification, i.e. the 
simultaneous inclusion of interactions. 
As a final experiment, we run estimations on individual HS 6-digit lines with and without 
the trade shares variable (as Kee et al., 2009; Cadot and Gourdon, 2016; Gourdon, 
Cadot and van Tongeren, 2018). A cursory glance at the coefficients for the NTM RI 
variable is not very promising, resulting in a majority of non-significant price effects of 
NTMs, as well as implausible results, either because of negativity or extremely large 
values, which otherwise, concurs with the detailed discussion by Cadot and Gourdon 
(2016). 
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Table 8: AVEs by NTM category and route (characteristic approach) 
  NonP A: SPS  B: TBT  NonAB    
Sector / Route 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean RI 3 
Gross AVE 
(%) 4 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE (%) 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE (%) 
Marginal 
AVE 
Mean 
RI 
Gross 
AVE (%) 
Tariff 
5 
General AVE 
No route 1                           
CMT 0.007*** 20.25 15% 0.004*** 15.1 7% 0.024*** 3.94 9% 0.003 1.21 0% 8% 
OMT 0.005** 22.85 11% 0.002 17.0 4% 0.003 4.97 2% 0.072*** 0.87 6% 5% 
MIL 0.002*** 27.55 6% 0.004*** 19.4 8% -0.003 5.99 -2% -0.005 2.14 -1% 8% 
CMT 2 
             
 From Merco / to EU 0.007*** 23.97 17% 0.004** 18.4 8% 0.024*** 4.41 11% 0.002 1.16 0% 49% 
 From NZL / to EU 0.008*** 23.34 20% 0.006** 18.4 10% 0.015** 4.313 7% 0.021* 0.62 1% 51% 
 From EU / to Asean 0.007*** 22.5 16% 0.004** 14.1 6% 0.025*** 4.83 12% -0.001 3.53 0% 8% 
OMT 2 
             
From Asean / to EU 0.005*** 24.72 12% 0.002 19.4 4% 0.004 5.25 2% 0.073*** 0.03 0% 28% 
From Mercosur / to EU 0.005*** 25.93 13% 0.004** 20.5 8% -0.004 5.089 -2% 0.072*** 0.28 2% 24% 
From EU / to Japan 0.004*** 12.93 5% 0.007*** 8.1 6% -0.020** 4.77 -10% 0.092*** 0.03 0% 16% 
MIL 2 
             
 From NZL / to EU 0.001*** 30.56 2% 0.001*** 23.1 4% -0.002 5.8 -1% 0.001 1.67 0% 47% 
 From EU / to Asean 0.002*** 21.61 5% 0.003*** 14.1 5% -0.001 5.094 0% -0.003 2.39 -1% 9% 
 From EU / to Japan 0.002*** 16.52 3% 0.004*** 8.1 3% -0.004 4.77 -2% -0.006 0.03 0% 43% 
Notes: ***, ** and * mean significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Significant Gross AVEs shaded. 
1 Marginal AVE evaluated at the means of trade shares of the exporter and importer in the full sample. 
2 Marginal AVEs evaluated at the means of trade shares, of the exporting region and importing region in the route. Mean trade shares are shown in the online tables file 
(sheet AVEs_Shares). The margins command is used in the computation, and significance is based on standard errors estimated with the Delta method. 
3 Mean of RI within the route. 
4 Global AVE obtained by multiplying Marginal AVE by mean RI. 
5 Average tariff in the route. 
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6 NTMs in simulation models 
6.1 Scoping of the literature review 
NTMs are classified according to the MAST classification, see appendix A1. The MAST 
classification differentiates between chapters of different types of measures (chapter A to 
chapter P), which are further divided into subchapters by digits. The broader categories 
are defined as technical (chapter A, B and C) and non-technical measures (all other 
chapters) as well as measures for imports and exports. 
We specifically focus on technical measures in chapter A, B and C of the MAST 
classification take various forms. As defined by UNCTAD (2015), chapter A contains SPS 
measures that regulate production processes and products, including the restriction for 
substances, in order to ensure food safety, and that prevent the dissemination of disease 
or pests for animal and plant health reasons. Chapter A also includes conformity-
assessment measures, certification requirements, licensing as well as testing and 
inspection, and quarantine. Chapter B contains technical measures that are defined as 
technical barriers to trade referred to as TBT measures. They are labelling requirements, 
standards on technical specifications and quality requirements, and other measures 
protecting the environment. Like in chapter A, all conformity-assessment measures 
related to technical requirements are also included. Chapter C contains measures related 
to pre-shipment inspections and other customs formalities, thereby being measures 
implemented at the border. 
The measures related to imports contain the requirements that importing countries 
impose on products from partner countries that export their products to the respective 
importing country. Exporting countries or rather exporters of partner countries have to 
fulfil these requirements in order supply the market of the importer. The requirements 
are the standards and norms for the domestic production of the importing country and 
commonly apply to all partner countries to gain market access. This is under the 
assumption that requirements are not discriminatory, implying that requirements for 
foreign products cannot be stricter than the requirements for domestically produced 
products, and that partner countries are treated equally according to the WTO rules. 
It is important to note that many NTMs are not primarily designed for protection but for 
public policy purposes. This can be food safety and quality but also other legitimate 
reasons of public policies. For the agri-food sector, there are many examples ranging 
from maximum residue levels and contamination and/or production standards in order to 
ensure safety and quality characteristic along the entire food supply chain to the ban of 
products due to disease outbreaks that pose risks to plant, animal and human health in 
partner countries. Another example is the standardization of products in order to make 
them compatible for use and the compliance testing for the safety of the product (e.g. 
standards for electric devices). If a reduction of NTMs implies a change in the technical 
and safety aspects of products, which are managed by respective measures, this should 
be taken into account in the welfare analysis. Some studies, like for example Van 
Tongeren et al. (2009) and Beghin et al. (2012), hence call for a cost-benefit analysis 
when investigating the NTM effect. 
6.2 Different types of effects of NTMs 
NTMs have various effects, and the different methods to modelling NTMs tend to capture 
specific aspects that are emphasized and that have consequences for the simulation and 
modelling results. Note we use the neutral term “NTMs” and hence refer to measures, 
rather than using the term “NTBs” that points towards measures that are defined as 
barriers to trade.  
As Beghin (2006) elaborates, NTMs cause different types of economic effects. First, there 
is a cost-raising and trade-restricting effect at the border, which can be called the 
“protection effect” of NTMs. However, as already mentioned, it should be noted that 
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NTMs have other societal and/or administrative objectives designed to regulate the 
domestic market, with the protection of local industries not necessarily being the policy 
intent. Considering the public policy objectives of NTMs, the implementation of measures 
leads to two broad economic effects: a shift of the supply curve or a shift of the demand 
curve (Roberts et al., 1999). In a more recent study, Fugazza and Maur (2008) 
distinguish these three types of effects (“production”, supply shift and demand shift) and 
specifically compare the trade-restricting and supply shift effect of NTMs in a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) setting of the GTAP model. In essence, the three types of 
effects depicted in simulation models can be summarized as follows:  
— Trade cost effects (“protection effect”): Trade cost effects have been depicted in 
simulation modes as price wedges between the world market price and the domestic 
price or as “iceberg tariffs”. For some trade policy measures, like tariff rate quotas, 
specific approaches have been developed (see for example Aziz and Pearson, 2005). 
Trade costs effects typically capture the change in costs directly related to the trading 
activity, for example inspection costs, cost of trade certificates, licenses and customs. 
Note that trade costs can occur on the exporter or importer side. The international 
MAST classification of NTMs comprises both measures on import and measures on 
export, with the latter for example being export restrictions. 
— Supply shift effects: Supply shift effects occur when regulations are used to tackle 
externalities and affect the international trade of products, such as preventing the 
sale of products hazardous for health or creating standards to increase compatibility 
and interoperability. Supply-shift effects are of particular relevance to TBT and SPS 
measures. Such regulations can specify production processes (for example the use of 
a certain technology) and/or product attributes (for example a maximum level of the 
content of certain components or maximum residue levels). They lead to a change in 
the production costs of products destined for the export market, for example because 
of different standards, certification requirements and/or a separation of production 
lines for products destine to different markets.  
— Demand shift effects: Demand shift effects relate to certain types of market failures. 
For instance, the compulsory provision of certain information to consumers potentially 
affects their buying behaviour and thus leads to changes of the demand curves in 
simulation models. Such demand shifts (and also supply shifts) are of particular 
relevance when depicting TBT and SPS measures. On the demand side, shifts can be 
identified for any sort of technical regulation that involves a change in the utility of 
the product for consumers; examples are better labelling, better quality guarantees 
or the faster delivery of products. 
6.3 NTMs modelled at the border 
6.3.1 NTMs modelled as price wedge between the import and export 
price (import tariffs/export tax) 
When considering NTMs just like import tariffs or export taxes, they are modelled as 
duties imposed on imports and/or exports. This would be the case for measures that 
cause trade costs, including tariff rate quotas and quantity restrictions. The latter also 
comprise bans that in essence can be modelled as a prohibitive tariff rate that results in a 
stop of trading activities in the simulation. In addition to the trade costs and hence the 
trade-hampering effect, rent-generating aspects of NTMs can be consider as being a 
critical focus of this modelling approach. In other words, if NTMs deem to create rents 
they could be depicted just like tariffs (or export taxes) in simulation models, with the 
rent being the tariff/tax income.  
In the context of NTMs, this modelling approach implies that the value of imported 
products is higher than the intrinsic value of those products against market prices, with 
the difference being the rent generated by the measures under review. If these costs are 
removed, the buyer of the imported product pays less for the same amount of the 
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imported product and therefore demand will increase. In that sense, the removal of NTMs 
generates the same type of effects like a tariff liberalisation. 
With the rent income in general being defined as revenue for government, this principle 
can be generalized to all types of rent income generated when depicting NTMs as import 
tariffs/export taxes. In CGE models, like the GTAP model, the rent income in the end 
goes to a regional household since government finance is not explicitly modelled. Hence, 
it is irrelevant in such a model set-up where the rent income accrues. However, other 
models explicitly account for government budgets or depict the behaviour of specific 
agents such that the respective agent’s behaviour depends on the rent income actually or 
potentially received. In these cases, it is important to explicitly model which agents 
receive the rent associated with the NTMs as well as how much of the rent income 
accrues to which agents.  
While import tariffs and export taxes are generally differentiated, the results of 
respectively modelling one or the other show the same effect on international trade 
because both types of duties increase the wedge between the export price and the 
import price. However, in the case of import tariffs, the rent in terms of tariff income 
goes to the importing country, while in the case of export tariffs the rent goes to the 
exporting country. In an analogue manner, the implementation of a specific NTM can be 
allocated to import and export tariffs depending on who receives the rents that the NTMs 
bring about. In the simulation model, it should be depicted who actually benefits from 
the measures under review. For removing NTMs, the argumentation holds with opposite 
results since the rent diminishes in case of a NTM reduction or they may be gone when 
the respective measures are abolished. 
Note that some NTMs can be considered as merely being rents that accrue to some 
agents without generating real costs for them. For example, agents may ask higher 
prices for services than the costs involved, fraud may generate income without a relevant 
service provided (Zaki, 2013). Such types of effects can be depicted by a reduction of 
import tariffs or export subsidies, depending on where the rent accrues. 
If the rents associated with the NTMs do not constitute an income for the government, 
they need to be subtracted from the government budget, or the model set-up (unlike in 
the GTAP model) should allow for making explicit for which agents the rents are reduced 
or added in order to prevent incorrect conclusions on government budget. 
This modelling approach obviously requires detailed information, as follows: information 
about the functioning of the respective measures as well as the associated rents, 
information about the agents gaining or losing rents, the magnitude and the distribution 
of the rent income. The information requirements are considerable and its application 
thus often remains theoretical.  
If the approach is applied, usually specific case studies are investigated to obtain realistic 
estimates. Alternatively, estimates from the literature could provide the detailed 
information that is used to make the necessary assumptions about the rents. In general, 
however, not much is known about the rents due to NTMs and the distribution of who 
gains and misses out from changes in NTMs. In a recent study on the EU-US 
Transatlantic Investment and Trade Partnership (TITP) that reduces NTMs between the 
two partners, Jafari and Britz (2018), for example, assume that 2/3 of the rent of rent-
generating NTMs is on imports and 1/3 on exports, while 40% of the NTMs is rent 
generating. These assumptions are based on Egger et al. (2015) and Francois et al. 
(2013). 
6.3.2 NTMs modelled as margin commodities 
In many cases, NTMs cause costs for trading activities, and reducing them thus means a 
cost reduction that has a bearing on the income from delivering sectors. Such types of 
NTMs could be modelled as margin commodities that are associated with margin costs 
explaining the difference between the value at the border of the exporting countries and 
the value at the border of the importing country. Example of NTMs includes procedural 
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issues and requirements such as rules for obtaining export certificates that cost time and 
money for importers or exporters. The NTM reduction in this case would lead to a 
reduction in the costs of obtaining certificates and hence a reduction of margin costs. 
Another example would be procedures at the border that also require time. Note that for 
perishable products, border procedures could mean a loss in the quality of the product 
during transport but also losses of quantity i.e., waste if products cannot be sold 
anymore. 
Modelling a NTM reduction by the margin commodities implies a reduction of the 
difference between import and export prices but also a decrease of the margin 
commodities, while the same amount of products is imported. The associated margin 
costs could be partly made by the importing countries and partly made by the exporting 
countries, but one could also argue that the margin commodities are actually delivered as 
transport services by the global transport sector. This could be depicted by the input 
coefficients for these costs.  
In this modelling approach, margin commodities could be extended beyond the 
international transport services to all services related to NTMs and assigned to the 
products subject to the specific measures. When simulating a NTM reduction, the 
respective margin commodities could be reduced. However, as far as we know, this 
approach has not been used because databases do not report services related to NTMs as 
margin commodities. Furthermore, Jafari and Britz (2018) state that the margins in the 
databases used for simulation models are too small for the reduction of ad-valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) for NTMs and instead the reduction of these margin costs are thus 
modelled as increases in the productivity of imported products (see section 6.3.3). 
6.3.3 NTMs modelled as “iceberg tariffs” 
A widely used approach that takes into account the trade cost and hence protectionist 
effect of NTMs is the “iceberg tariff” approach. The “iceberg tariffs” has become the state 
of the art for modelling NTMs in simulation models that reply on the Armington equation. 
Samuelson (1954) described that the value of traded products may melt away just as an 
iceberg melts away. The quantity of products arriving in the importing country is 
assumed to be less than the quantity of products leaving the exporting country. In the 
context of NTMs, the “iceberg tariffs” are the trade costs (due to NTMs) that are 
commonly determined by AVE estimates, like the ones estimated in the first part of this 
report, and are shocked in the respective simulations.  
Modelling NTMs as “iceberg tariffs” may be taken literally for products that perish during 
transport but, in practice, all costs caused by NTMs are assumed to be paid for by the 
products that are traded. The “iceberg tariff” approach models a NTM reduction as a 
technological change that reduces the imports needed to generate the same value of 
imported products. In GTAP, this is depicted by a shock of the variable “ams”, with the 
AVEs for NTMs providing the size of the shock. 
In the case of modelling a NTM reduction, the productivity parameter for imported 
products “ams” is decreased such that the amount of imports needed for the imported 
product to generate the same utility of the imported product gets smaller. Hence, the 
imported product becomes more productive. This implies that the effective relative price 
of the imported products gets lower and consequently more products will be imported. 
The size of the effect depends on the elasticity of substitution where the import elasticity 
is mostly more than one, generating an increase in the value of imports. 
In essence, the “iceberg tariff” approach models a NTM reduction by two effects: the 
reduction of the “iceberg tariff” that causes a decrease of the price of the specific import 
product, and in turn for this product the quantity demanded increases, and the decrease 
of the imported product needed in order to generate the same utility and satisfy the 
import demand. With the decrease of the imported product needed, the quantity of 
imports does not match the quantity of exports. The trade values remain in balance due 
to the price effect described. Most importantly, generating the same utility with a smaller 
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quantity of imported products leads to the considerable efficiency effect that dominates 
the modelling results, as Fugazza and Maur (2008) show in their experiment of removing 
NTMs in the GTAP model. 
Since in the set-up of the GTAP model efficiency gains are equally distributed to all 
imports, an unambiguous positive welfare effect (expressed by the equivalent variation 
measure) can be expected for all countries and trade diversion effects are not shown. As 
Fugazza and Maur (2008) elaborate, the magnitude of the efficiency gains of different 
countries is determined by the value of their initial imports and the size of the initial 
AVEs. Hence, large trading countries and also countries with relatively high AVEs for 
NTMs tend to benefit most from the NTM reduction or removal.  
In the “iceberg tariffs” approach, the effect of the NTM reduction tends to results in a 
substantial welfare effect. This is an important difference between modelling NTMs as 
price wedges (i.e. tariff) and modelling them as “iceberg tariffs” that deserves attention 
when determining the size of the “ams” shock. Fugazza and Maur (2008) recommend to 
use only small shocks in order to obtain realistic results of the “iceberg tariffs” approach. 
6.4 NTMs that shift the supply curve 
Supply is determined by the input factors used in the products, both domestically 
generated and imported inputs, with price and quantities making up the production costs. 
Modelling NTMs on the supply side involves shifts of the supply curves that reflect the 
marginal costs of production according to microeconomic theory. NTMs that directly 
relate to the production of products have been modelled by considering the direct 
production effect of the measures under review, thereby shifting supply curves. In the 
literature, the effect in the production process associated with the NTM is typically 
modelled, rather than modelling a NTM reduction. This means that the implementation of 
NTMs is usually modelled by adding compliance costs or accounting for the production 
effects, depending on the measure under review.  
Stone et al. (2015), for example, model the requirement of local content requirements in 
the OECD general equilibrium model "ModElling TRade at the OECD" (METRO). Instead of 
introducing AVEs for the NTM and thus simulating the price effect, the authors use 
quantities rather than prices in order to depict the geographic distribution of purchases 
due to local content requirements. More specifically, in their approach, an intermediate 
nesting identifies the specific imports and domestic supply at the level of the product 
composite at the activity level where producers decide on the intermediate input use 
(according to the optimal allocation at given prices). Taking the percentage share of 
domestic and foreign inputs, the local content requirements becomes binding when the 
share of domestic inputs is below the threshold required. With supply curves being 
shifted due to the compliance with the local contents requirements, this modelling 
approach brings about market adjustment processes.  
Compliance with requirements usually refers to compliance with domestic regulations 
rather than with requirements that importing countries impose on foreign products. 
However, the requirements of importing countries that reflect the domestic regulations 
have a bearing on the production in the exporting country and such NTMs are thus 
considered as behind-the-border measures. Behind-the-border measures affect 
producers in terms of compliance costs. Ganslandt and Markusen (2001) elaborate on the 
modelling of compliance costs and the resulting shifts of supply curves in a theoretical 
and illustrative way (in combination with demand shifts). Van Tongeren et al. (2009) 
apply the supply shift approach for the costs of market failures, by setting the analysis of 
NTMs in a cost-benefit framework. While they consider both the producer and consumer 
side, we focus on the producers and hence the supply side. The shifts of demand curves 
are considered in Section 6.6. 
NTMs are depicted by a cost-increasing shift of supply curves. On the on hand, the size of 
the shift can be determined by the compliance costs, thereby differentiation between 
compliant and non-compliant products. In the OECD cost-benefit framework, the costs of 
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NTMs are also approximated by the production losses due to diseases that are regulated 
by the measures. For details, see van Tongeren et al. (2009): pp 22. The effect of SPS 
measures that regulate the outbreak and spread of diseases is depicted by a shift of the 
supply curve, while considering the probability of the production loss according to risk-
levels. For an application to the EU measures that prevent the introduction, infestation 
and spread of harmful diseases on cut flowers, see van Tongeren et al. (2010). 
Such supply shifts are usually modelled in partial equilibrium models that allow for the 
details necessary for the specific case under review. Given the availability of in-depth 
information, usually case studies like the case studies by the OECD are investigated in 
considerable detail; see van Tongeren et al. (2010).  
Furthermore, it makes sense to consider the supply shift approach for modelling market 
integration but also when reducing NTMs in the context of the trade agreements that 
contain chapters on NTMs and regulatory cooperation. Changes in requirements following 
regulatory harmonization cause adjustment costs for producers. These costs are usually 
neglected in studies that apply the “iceberg tariff” approach to assess the NTM impact of 
the regional trade agreements.  
As an exception, Rau and Verma (2015) explore the effects of the EU deep and 
comprehensive trade agreements (DCFTAs) with eastern neighbours by incorporating 
adjustment costs in their application of the GTAP model. The focus is on the EU DCFTA 
with the Ukraine as a case study. Next to the NTM reduction, the authors model the costs 
of adjustment as value added in the agri-food production nest by arguing that the NTM 
reduction foreseen in the DCFTA is only possible with costly adjustments, i.e. 
investments, in the Ukraine.  
Production and market adjustment can be considered as being a direct consequence of 
the application of common standards and thus regulatory harmonization. Here, the 
difference between investment costs (i.e. fixed costs) and variable costs should be noted, 
compare Section 6.5. It can be argued that market integration through harmonisation 
causes adjustment costs and thus investments to apply common standards, but there are 
also likely benefits in terms of upgrading to higher quality, technology updates and 
technical changes that could result from the uptake of certain norms in particular in 
countries and sectors that are not as advanced. In these countries and sectors, standards 
may thus increase the production efficiency. 
Note that trade agreements may contain chapters on mutual recognition, rather than 
chapters on regulatory harmonization. In this case, products do not have to satisfy 
common requirements but are considered just like domestic product. 
6.5 Modelling NTMs and imperfect competition 
The standard Armington approach to international trade assumes a type of perfect 
competition, although the idea of applying a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
between different source regions is that commodities from different regions are not 
perfect substitutes. In standard CGE models using the Armington approach, products 
from different countries are thus considered to be imperfect substitutes, but products 
from the same country are considered as perfect substitutes and within a country there is 
perfect competition (Akgul et al., 2016). 
In the literature, early studies model the NTM reduction in the context of EU market 
integration by making products in the EU and those in accession countries more 
substitutable via the Armington elasticities (e.g. Harrison et al., 1996 and Gasiorek et al., 
1992). For assessing other comprehensive trade and investment agreements with some 
degree of market integration, this approach is, for example, also applied by Harrison et 
al. (1996), Harrison et al. (1997) and Rutherford and Martinez (2002). In essence, the 
NTM reduction has been depicted as making products more similar to each other, and 
thus the benefits of the NTM reduction comes from the EU consumers‘ ability to 
substitute among the products of the different EU countries. This increases the 
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competition with the completion of the EU common market where NTMs were abolished 
by the EU harmonised standards and after the Cassis de Dijon case by the principle of 
mutual recognition, reducing mark-ups in imperfectly competitive industries. 
Following recent developments in trade theory, research has started to explore the NTM 
impact in models that account for heterogeneous firm with imperfect competition, fixed 
trade and production costs and love of variety. Modelling approaches that account for 
heterogeneous firms lend themselves to model the fixed and variable costs of NTMs.  
Jafari and Britz (2018) and Akgul et al. (2016), for example, have developed modules 
that depict heterogeneous firms in a GTAP modelling framework. They built on the trade 
model with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003). In heterogeneous firms models, the 
sector productivity is endogenous through firm entry and exit. Firms draw from a Pareto 
distribution of productivities and have economies of scale because of fixed (sunk) costs. 
In order to model the fixed costs, specific nests for fixed and variable costs are made in 
the production trees. Fixed costs are further split into fixed costs of trading and fixed 
costs of setting up production. The fixed costs may be investments in research and 
development, advertising and setting up distribution channels in order to create a specific 
variety of products. With respect to exports, the fixed costs include the set-up of new 
production lines to make products consistent with regulations, and learning about rules 
and regulations on shipping, packaging, labelling and so on (Akgul et al. 2016). In this 
modelling approach, NTMs are considered to have direct effects on the fixed trading costs 
in the production function. As mentioned, NTMs that may stipulate specific requirements 
can bring about such fixed (investment) costs, thereby limiting the firms’ entry into 
markets.  
Firms operate on a market with monopolistic competition, implying that also less 
productive firms can survive. Due to the fixed costs to develop an export market, only 
the most productive firms are able to enter export markets. Less productive firms sell on 
the domestic market, and the firms with the lowest productivity are not able to survive at 
all. The number of firms that survives depends on the productivity distribution, the 
substitution elasticities between the different products in demand and the size of the 
fixed costs.  
Reducing (NTM-related) fixed costs in trade or production results in an increase of the 
number of varieties because more firms are able to bare the export costs. At the same 
time, production costs fall because the most productive firms are able to enter export 
markets and expand, forcing low productivity firms out of the market. With the 
aforementioned changes of the number and productivity of competing firms, the NTM 
reduction thus influences both costs in production and in trade. Due to the effect on the 
sector productivity, reducing NTMs in models of heterogeneous firms has implications 
comparable to those of modelling the NTM reduction by the “supply shift” approach 
described above. 
In addition, reducing the (NTM-related) fixed costs in heterogeneous firm model also has 
consequences for the utility function due to the love of variety effect. A larger number of 
firms following the reduction of (NTM-related) fixed costs involves a shift of the utility 
curve. In this sense, modelling NTMs in the heterogeneous firm model also shows 
elements of the “demand shift” approach. 
Models of heterogeneous firms take into account new channels of welfare effects in 
scenarios of trade liberalisation in general: First, the productivity effect because of the 
expansion of more productive firms. Second, the increased utility and reduced input costs 
because of the increase in the number of varieties. Third, there is a scale effect. Since 
variable costs decrease as a consequence of cheaper imports of intermediate inputs, the 
average size of the firm increases, which means that the fixed costs that remain 
unchanged can be distributed across more products. Finally, with the increase of the 
number of firms that export, fixed export costs also increase, leading to a welfare loss 
(Akgul et al. 2016). 
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In order to compare results of the Melitz approach with the Armington and Krugman 
(1980) approaches, Akgul et al. (2016) calibrate the tariffs in the NTMs to give the same 
trade effects in the Melitz approach like in the Armington approach. In general, the 
welfare effect is larger because in the Melitz approach not only the costs of imported 
commodities are reduced but also the production costs of domestic commodities are 
reduced and the utility is increased because of a larger number of varieties. Jafari and 
Britz (2018) compare the Armington and the Melitz approach without adjusting the NTM 
tariffs to generate the same amount of trade. As a consequence, trade liberalization in 
the Melitz approach generates more trade than in the Armington approach. Akgul et al. 
(2016) and Jafari and Britz (2018) indicate that results for welfare changes, production 
and costs are very different between the Melitz approach and the Armington approach. 
6.6 NTMs that shift the demand curve 
NTMs can shift the demand curve due to their effect on the consumers’ utility. For 
example, if a measure stipulates labelling, standardising products for compatibility 
reasons or ensures food safety or quality of imported products, the consumer’s demand 
of the imported products may increase. Similarly, consumers may for example value 
domestic and imported products that are produced according to certain standards and 
that are guaranteed to be safe for consumption. Usually this shift of the demand curve is 
reflected by the consumers’ willingness to pay.  
In the OECD cost-benefit framework, van Tongeren et al. (2009) discuss and incorporate 
the willingness to pay for NTMs (especially SPS and TBT measures) in a partial 
equilibrium model. They specifically consider the consumer’s risk awareness and stated 
preferences. The case study of raw milk cheese in the US/Canada illustrates the 
application of this approach by taking into account that food-borne diseases affect some 
groups of the population more than others; for details see van Tongeren et al. (2010). As 
for the “supply shift” approach, studies applying the “demand shift” approach require 
considerable data and are thus typically case studies, like the one mentioned above. 
Walmsely and Minor (2016) explore options to introduce actual estimates of the 
willingness to pay in a fully-fledged CGE model. To our knowledge, they are the only 
authors that do not conduct detailed case study work on specific cases of willingness to 
pay but systematically and consistently approximate shifts of demand curves without 
model recalibration. In their study, they estimate the willingness to pay for a speedy and 
more reliable delivery of products by using information on the average number of days at 
custom (as provided by the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators), the US information on 
trade and transport modes and price difference between transport by air and by ocean to 
reveal time preferences (see Hummels et al, 2007; Hummels, 2001). Reducing the time 
for customs clearance and delays is part of the trade facilitation efforts that benefit both 
businesses and consumers. Reducing time and the number of delays at customs implies 
the improvement of procedures, i.e. for example getting rid of inefficiencies like “red 
tape” and complexities that cause NTM-related trade costs mainly at the border. 
As mentioned, Walmsely and Minor (2016) explore the following different approaches to 
depicting the increased willingness to pay for fast deliveries of products in the Armington 
function: price changes modelled by a reduction of implicit tariffs; changes of substitution 
elasticities and the “iceberg tariff” approach (“ams” shock in GTAP). For details on these 
approaches to modelling NTMs in simulation models see the respective sections in this 
report. 
In addition, Walmsely and Minor (2016) introduce the approach of changes in the 
preference parameter in order to depict the benefits of trade facilitation that helps to 
overcome and reduce obstacles due to NTMs. Their approach is implemented in the OECD 
METRO model; see OECD (2017a) and (2017b).  
In economic terms, the approach of depicting the willingness to pay in order to account 
for NTMs can be summarised as follows: first, the changes of the preference parameter 
will change the slope of the indifference curve between the imported products, thereby 
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rotating the utility function such that a new preference structure is depicted; secondly 
the utility function will shift down since the same utility can be obtain with less quantity 
consumed at current prices.  
Shifting the preference parameter is not straightforward since preference parameters at 
higher levels depend on those at lower levels. For example, if the preference parameter 
in the equation that distributes the demand for imported products across different 
exporting regions are changed, the aggregate of the imported products also becomes 
more attractive, implying that the preference parameter in the equation explaining the 
choice between imported and domestically produced products will also change. In the 
setting of the GTAP model, this mean that the Armington function is extended by having 
agent-specific functions that allocate imported commodities across the different exporting 
regions, instead of first aggregating import demand from all agents and subsequently 
distributing the imports across the different exporting regions. This has implications for 
the demand of the agents, including consumers, and thus preference parameters are also 
changed in the equations that determine the consumption, which in turn may also 
influence the agents’ savings decision. 
For the practical implementation, OECD (2017b) and (2017a) depict the benefits of fast 
delivery by accounting for efficiency gains as well as the utility gains described above. 
While the efficiency gains are model by the “iceberg tariff” approach (“ams” shock), the 
utility gains are model by the aforementioned preference parameters that rotate and shift 
the utility function in the willingness to pay approach that lead to changes of the demand 
curve.  
Comparing the results of the “iceberg tariff” approach and the willingness to pay 
approach, it is interesting to note that the difference in welfare effects is only small. 
However, the results for GDP considerably differ since in the willingness to pay approach 
the fast delivery is valued by consumers but not accounted for in GDP. The trade effect in 
the application of the willingness to pay approach is larger than the one in the “iceberg 
tariff” approach. “Iceberg-tariffs” allow agents to buy fewer imports to satisfy the same 
utility. In contrast, the preference structure changes and consumers demand more of the 
imported products to satisfy the increased utility they receive from consuming the 
improved products, i.e. the fast delivery of products. Hence, trade increases in the 
willingness to pay approach, and the increase is more pronounced than the one in the 
“iceberg tariff” approach. For further difference of the results of the “iceberg tariff” 
approach and those of the willingness to pay approach, see Walmsely and Minor (2016). 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Conclusions for the NTM AVE estimation 
In this report we explore empirically the price-approach to calculate ad-valorem 
equivalents for non-tariff measures. The applications have focused on three GTAP food 
sectors: CMT (cattle meat/beef), OMT (other meat) and MIL (dairy), and three bilateral 
routes per sector, where the EU is either the importer or the exporter, and other partners 
involved are ASEAN (South East Asean Association), Mercosur, Japan and New Zealand. 
A literature review on the price-approach as well as a discussion that compares the 
alternative and/or complementary quantity approaches is presented. The main 
conclusions can be summarized as follows. 
First, an inspection of the trade unit values database reveals an extremely high 
dispersion of values in the meat and dairy sectors. A careful examination would be 
needed in order to understand if such variability is theoretically and empirically 
consistent with specific economic drivers. Complementarily, we suggest as a future line 
of development, to work on the outlier detection. 
Second, econometrically, the price approach is less challenging than the quantity 
approach since Ordinary Linear Squares (OLS) can be easily applied to a log-linear 
specification without losing relevant information (i.e. zero trade values in the quantity 
approach require non-linear Poisson estimators). 
Third, compared with the quantity approach, the price approach has the advantage of not 
relying on an elasticity of substitution to translate the quantity impact of NTMs into an 
ad-valorem equivalent. 
Fourth, how the NTM explanatory variable enters the model has important implications. A 
positive and significant impact of regulatory intensity (i.e. a variable that counts the 
number of measures) is found in every model, and when relativizing the unit or marginal 
impacts by the average number of measures in the sample, the AVEs values move in the 
range 6-16%, for the sectors analysed. The NTM dummy specification (i.e. a variable that 
indicates the presence/absence of at least one measure) on the other hand leads to more 
pronounced impacts that are however only significant for cattle meat/beef (61%). We 
also find that the price effects for different types of measures (SPS, TBT and others) are 
additive, although a slight overestimation of trade costs occurs by using the aggregated 
regulatory intensity. Based on this particular empirical application, we favour the 
continuous regulatory intensity measurement of NTMs over the dummy variable, which 
also provides closer estimates to those found in the literature. 
Fifth, amongst the two alternative approaches explored to calculate bilateral AVEs for 
specific trade routes, our empirical application provides more consistent and economic 
coherent results using the indirect characteristics rather than the route interaction 
approach, in particular when splitting NTMs by the type of measures. Using the 
characteristics approach (in particular, measured through importer and exporter trade 
shares), the overall price rising impact tends to be nuanced in particular routes, with 
some interesting insights. For instance, the average 16% AVE for cattle meat/beef is 
kept in the route EU-Asean, and goes up to 20% in the route New Zealand-EU, and 17% 
in Mercosur-EU. 
In the context of the discussion of results by Cadot et al. (2016) where the difficulties 
encountered in the process of obtaining economic coherent figures for AVEs were 
detailed, our results using the price approach are encouraging.  
The price approach may potentially be perceived as preferable in those cases where 
either the elasticities of substitution taken from the literature do not really apply to the 
specific combination (i.e. sector and region) under consideration, or where the in-model 
estimated trade cost elasticity (i.e. the tariff coefficient estimated) is not reliable enough 
due to endogeneity issues or other complications in the estimation procedure (i.e. lack of 
significance or wrong sign). Alternatively, the quantity-value approach relies on data 
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subject to quality checks and can provide insights into the trade-prohibiting impact of 
NTMs that the price approach cannot address. Recent developments on the quantity-
volume approach, on the other hand, seem an interesting avenue of research. 
Based on the above considerations, some future developments could be: 
1. Improving the data quality of trade unit values and trade volumes by the design of 
procedures for systematic detection of outliers, and their removal and/or replacement 
by adequate values. 
2. Formulating the price and quantity approaches in a common econometric framework 
to better disentangle the compliance costs and the demand-enhancing effects of 
NTMs, probably by applying simultaneous systems of equations. 
3. Designing a taxonomy of NTMs according to the type of costs, fixed costs (i.e. 
upgrades of production lines and codes of practice) or variable costs (i.e. conformity 
assessments) that they induce. The aim of such taxonomy would be to better address 
the potential impact of NTMs on trade and welfare. This would potentially help to 
develop more targeted trade policies. A combination of desk research, interviews with 
experts, checks against case studies and quantitative empirical modelling would be 
necessary for these improvements. 
4. Automating the AVE calculation procedure so that results for specific routes and 
sectors were easy to retrieve in response to the needs of policy analysts or other 
stakeholders. The simplest way would be to use a baseline model already estimated, 
while further levels of customization would imply the development of in-built routines 
for the automatic change of the model specification and consequent estimation. 
5. Developing a web tool for data (e.g. NTMs regulatory intensity) and NTMs AVEs 
visualization, for instance, through maps, graphs, etc. 
7.2 Conclusions for modelling NTMs in simulation models 
We reviewed the recent literature in order to identify the approaches to depicting NTMs in 
simulation models. With regard to trade, the cost-increasing effect of NTMs is 
emphasized in most modelling approaches, with simulations depicting the NTM reduction 
by a decrease in trade costs. On the demand side, the benefits of NTM reductions are 
usually not depicted and are thus not directly covered. One recent exception is the 
willingness to pay approach by Walmsely and Minor (2016) that specifically depict the 
benefit of overcoming obstacles due to NTMs in efforts of trade facilitation. In their 
approach, they introduce shifts in demand curves by preference parameters that the shift 
and rotate utility function in the general equilibrium modelling framework used.  
Next to Walmsely and Minor (2016), only few studies consider the benefits of NTMs 
(measured by the consumers’ willingness to pay) but these studies typically comprise in-
depth studies of very specific cases. For these case studies, detailed data is available and 
the NTM analysis conducted is mainly set in a cost-benefit framework applied in partial 
equilibrium models; e.g. van Tongeren et al. (2009) and (2010).  
Considering the existing literature, we conclude that the NTM impact first and foremost is 
an empirical question and argue that the estimations of the NTM impact beyond gravity is 
crucial for bringing forward methodological approaches to depicting NTMs in simulation 
models. Most approaches indeed rely on AVEs estimates for NTMs, like those generated 
in the first part of the report. It should however be noted that, instead of applying 
consistent AVE estimates, ad hoc shocks are often applied to simulate a NTM reduction. 
When analysing the effects of trade agreements with chapters on NTMs, such ad hoc 
shocks are not estimated but estimates available in the literature are simply used. Here, 
Kee et al. (2009) and more recently Gourdon et al. (2018) provide comprehensive 
databases of AVE estimates for NTMs that could be a starting point for determine the 
shocks for the NTM reduction. In general, the NTM reduction should reflect the 
actionability of actually reducing measures, given that entirely abolishing all NTMs is not 
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a realistic scenario. Following Francois et al. (2013), a 25 % reduction in NTMs is 
considered as being actionable in most analyses of trade agreements.  
The “iceberg tariff” approach has become the standard method to depicting NTMs in 
simulation models. In this approach, two effects of reduced NTMs are essentially 
considered: a decrease of the price of the specific import product initially subject to the 
NTM, which results in an increase of the quantity of imports demanded, and a decrease 
of the imported product needed in order to generate the same utility and satisfy the 
import demand. The latter constitutes an efficiency effect modelled like a technological 
change that in the end drives the results of the “iceberg tariff” approach. Results of the 
reducing “iceberg tariffs” are in general more pronounced than those of a comparable 
tariff liberalisation scenario.  
Overall, the data needs for depicting NTMs in simulation models are substantial. 
Information about the functioning of measures and even more details are necessary 
when taking into account specific effects of NTMs that occur behind the border and thus 
have a bearing on production and markets both in the exporting and importing countries. 
For example, information about the rents that some agents may obtain due to NTMs 
would be needed to adequately distribute the costs and benefits of NTMs across agents 
but also across countries.  
New advances in trade theory have proliferated the development of the modelling 
approaches of NTMs. In particular, the differentiation between fixed and variable costs 
makes the heterogeneous firms models extremely interesting for the NTM analysis. In 
general, accounting for heterogeneous firms generates fundamentally different results by 
changing productivity through the selection of firms into supplying the domestic and 
foreign market, market structure and the number of firms and thus product variety, 
which adds to the standard welfare measurement.  
In a GAMS-based GTAP model, Jafari and Britz (2018) specifically apply a 
"heterogeneous firms" module to analyse the effects of the fixed costs of NTMs. In 
addition to modelling the fixed costs of NTMs, the authors combine different methods to 
depicting a NTM reduction while stating that the modellers, hence the authors had to 
decide how to allocate AVE estimates to the different modelling mechanisms that 
represent the different aspects of the effects of the measures under review. Accounting 
for heterogeneous firms allows for looking at behind-the-border measures that often 
involve investments (fixed costs) for adopting production processes to meet certain NTM 
requirements and that hence do not have the same effect on all firms. The differentiated 
effects of NTMs could be analysed by the heterogeneous firms approach if the necessary 
detailed information on firms and sectors is available. Such an analysis would shed light 
on market structure effects and the question about who actually benefits and loses due 
to NTMs and/or due the NTM reduction, which is typically negotiated and agreed upon in 
trade agreements.  
In the NTM analysis by simulation models, one criticism applying to all assessments of 
trade agreements is that the NTM reduction is modelled without taking adjustment costs 
into account. For example, Rau and Verma (2015) argue that reducing “ iceberg tariff” 
costs are not sufficient when assessing trade agreements that stipulate improved market 
access and integration by harmonization, rather than mutual recognition, to overcome 
regulatory difference. This is since adjustment costs can, at least in the short-run, 
dampen and even outweigh the benefits of the trade agreements for some countries 
and/or for some agents that may need to be compensated in order for not being left 
behind in an increasingly globalised and interrelated world. 
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MAST 
chapter 
Technical Measure Brief description Examples 
A SANITARY AND 
PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES (SPS) 
Measures that are applied 
to protect human or animal 
life from risks arising from 
additives, contaminants, 
toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in their food 
 hazard analysis and 
critical control point 
(HACCP) requirements 
 maximum residue limit 
is established for 
insecticides, pesticides, 
heavy metals and 
veterinary drug residues 
 testing and certificate 
requirements for SPS 
related factors 
B TECHNICAL 
BARRIERS TO TRADE 
(TBT) 
Measures referring to 
technical regulations, and 
procedures for assessment 
of conformity with technical 
regulations and standards 
 Labelling, marking and 
packaging requirements 
 Product identity 
requirement (including 
biological or organic 
labels) 
 Conformity assessment 
related to TBT (including 
testing, certification and 
traceability) 
C PRE-SHIPMENT 
INSPECTION AND 
OTHER CUSTOMS 
FORMALITIES 
Compulsory quality, 
quantity and price control 
of goods prior to shipment 
from the exporting country, 
conducted by an 
independent inspecting 
agency mandated by the 
authorities of the importing 
country 
 Goods imported under a 
preferential scheme such 
as GSP must be shipped 
directly from the country 
of origin in order to 
satisfy the scheme’s 
rules of origin condition 
D CONTINGENT 
TRADE-PROTECTIVE 
MEASURES 
Measures that counteract 
adverse effects of imports 
in the market of the 
importing country, 
contingent on fulfilling 
certain conditions 
 Antidumping – to 
counteract imports 
“injuring” domestic 
companies 
 Countervailing – to 
counteract subsidies of 
exporting country 
E NON-AUTOMATIC 
LICENSING, 
QUOTAS, 
PROHIBITIONS AND 
QUANTITY-CONTROL 
(MEASURES OTHER 
THAN FOR SPS OR 
TBT REASONS) 
Measures to limit the 
quantity traded, such as 
quotas. It also covers 
licences and import 
prohibitions that are not 
SPS- or TBT-related 
 An import-licensing 
procedure where 
approval is discretionary 
or requires specific 
criteria to be met 
 Restriction of imports by 
a maximum quantity or 
value that is authorized.  
 Tariff rate quotas – for 
EU fish traders as this 
may result in different 
tariffs (i.e. zero or WTO) 
being charged within or 
above quota limits 
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F PRICE-CONTROL 
MEASURES, 
INCLUDING 
ADDITIONAL TAXES 
AND CHARGES 
Measures implemented to 
control or affect the prices 
of imported goods to, e.g. 
support the domestic price 
of certain products when 
the import prices of these 
goods are lower.  
 Variable taxes or levies 
aimed to bring the 
market prices of 
imported products in line 
with corresponding 
domestic products 
 Customs surcharge, 
surtax or additional duty 
 Taxes levied only on 
imports that have 
domestic equivalents 
G FINANCE MEASURES Measures intended to 
regulate the access to and 
cost of foreign exchange 
for imports and define the 
terms of payment.  
 They may increase 
import costs in the same 
manner as tariff 
measures 
 Advance payment 
requirements (import 
transaction and/or 
import taxes) 
 Multiple exchange rates 
(varying rates, 
depending on the 
product category) 
 Prohibition of foreign 
exchange allocation and 
other authorisations) 
H MEASURES 
AFFECTING 
COMPETITION 
Measures to grant 
exclusive or special 
preferences to one or more 
limited group of economic 
operators 
 These refer mainly to 
monopolistic measures, 
such as State trading, 
sole importing agencies, 
or compulsory national 
insurance or transport 
I TRADE-RELATED 
INVESTMENT 
MEASURES 
Measures that restrict 
investment by requiring 
local content, or requesting 
that investment should be 
related to exports to 
balance imports 
 Requirements to 
purchase or use 
minimum levels of 
domestically produced or 
sourced products  
 Restrictions on the 
importation of products 
used in local production 
J DISTRIBUTION 
RESTRICTIONS 
Measures that restrict the 
distribution of goods inside 
the importing country 
 Limit sales of imports to 
certain areas within the 
importing country 
 Limit import sales to 
designated retailers 
K RESTRICTIONS ON 
POST-SALES 
SERVICES 
Measures restricting 
producers of exported 
goods to provide post-sales 
service 
 After-sales servicing 
must be provided by a 
local company of the 
importing country 
L SUBSIDIES Financial contribution, e.g. 
made by government or 
public body 
 A provision to producers 
(e.g. to support 
replacement of 
production equipment) 
giving an unfair 
advantage against 
competition of imported 
products 
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M GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT 
RESTRICTIONS 
Measures controlling the 
purchase of goods by 
government agencies 
 This may be to stop 
preference to national 
providers 
N INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
Intellectual property rights 
in trade 
 Legislation covers e.g. 
patents, trademarks, 
copyright and trade 
secrets 
O RULES OF ORIGIN Laws, regulations and 
administrative 
determinations of general 
application applied by 
government of importing 
countries to determine the 
country of origin of goods 
 For fish products, rules 
of origin must be shown 
on import to EU 
countries. This includes 
processed products and 
may be open to 
challenge if the correct 
documents are not 
available 
P EXPORT-RELATED 
MEASURES 
Applied by the government 
of the exporting country on 
exported goods. 
 Export-licenses, export 
quotas, prohibition of 
exports 
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Annex 2. Product and country selection for the NTM estimation 
EU Trade negotiations in progress 
DG Trade webpage (ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/ negotiations-and-
agreements/) provides information about those regions with which the EU is engaged or 
envisages to engage in trade negotiations. Amongst these, we can highlight: 
● Mercosur (Argentina, Brasil, Uruguay, Paraguay). Association agreement 
resumed in 2016. 
● India: Free Trade Agreement negotiations ongoing 
● Japan: Economic partnership agreement in July 2017, still not into force 
● ASEAN: Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Singapore. While an agreement exists with the last two countries, it has not 
entered into force yet. Bilateral negotiations with the rest of countries are still 
ongoing. 
● Australia and New Zealand: The EU Commission proposed negotiating 
directives recently, in September 2017. 
● South Mediterranean (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia). Negotiations ongoing, 
while in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, an update of the previous 
Association Agreement into a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, 
started in 2013. 
● Mexico: a modernisation of global agreement started in 2016 
Database on Non-tariff measures  
Since April 2017, UNCTAD made available a database on the inventory of NTMs (I-
tip.unctad.org/Forms/Analysis.aspx), which puts together all the information for 57 
reporters, conducting the calculation of the number of measures applied, by hs6 sector, 
within each 4-digit NTM category (i.e. MAST classification). This database represents a 
substantial advantage with respect to previous NTM-TRAINS datasets (i.e. individual for 
each reporter, number of measures required own calculations, and less information, such 
as the type of coverage, was recorded). Besides, it includes amongst the reporters 
ASEAN countries (Table 1). As a drawback, South Mediterranean countries (Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia) are not covered by this dataset. 
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TABLE A1. Availability of NTMs and Unit Values data for selected regions 
Trade 
agreements 
ongoing or 
envisaged 
with: 
TRAINS NTMs availability - Region 
as reporter 
Unit Trade Values availability- 
Region as reporter 
 CMT OMT MIL CMT OMT MIL WHT 
Mercosur        
 Argentina Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [69] 
 Brasil Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
[137] 
 Uruguay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [63] 
 Paraguay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [39] 
India Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [63] 
Japan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
[129] 
ASEAN        
 Myanmar Y Y Y Y [16] Y 
[29] 
Y Y [1] 
 Philippines Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Indonesia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Thailand Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Malaysia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Vietnam Y Y Y N Y[4] N Y 
 Singapore Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Australia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [76] 
New 
Zealand 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [98] 
South Medit        
 Egypt N N N Y Y Y Y 
 Jordan N N N Y Y Y Y [93] 
 Morocco N N N Y Y Y Y 
 Tunisia N N N Y Y Y Y 
Mexico Y Y Y Y Y Y Y [65] 
EU Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: Y: yes; N: no; small number of observations highlighted in brackets 
GTAP sectors “Cattle meat” (CMT), “Other meat” (OMT) and “Dairy” (MIL), “Wheat” (WHT).  
  
61 
Annex 3. Mapping of the GTAP products to HS codes 
MAGNET HS6 Description 
OAP (GTAP) 
PLTRY 010511 Live fowls of species Gallus domesticus, weighing not >185g 
PLTRY 010512 Live turkeys, weighing not >185g 
PLTRY 010511 Live fowls of species Gallus domesticus, weighing not >185g 
PLTRY 010512 Live turkeys, weighing not >185g 
PLTRY 010519 Live ducks/geese/guinea fowls, weighing not >185g 
PLTRY 010592 Other :-- Fowls of the species Gallus domesticus, weighing not 
more than 2,000 g 
PLTRY 010593 Other :-- Fowls of the species Gallus domesticus, weighing more 
than 2,000 g 
PLTRY 010599 Live ducks/geese/turkeys/guinea fowls, weighing >185g 
PLTRY 040700 Birds' eggs, in shell, fresh/preserved/cooked 
PLTRY 050510 Feathers of a kind used for stuffing; down 
PLTRY 050590 Skins & other parts of birds with feathers/down; feathers & parts 
of feathers 
(excl. of 0505.10), not further worked than cleaned, 
disinfected/treated for 
 preservation; powder & waste of feathers/parts of feathers 
OAP  010310 Live swine: pure-bred breeding animals 
OAP  010391 Live swine other than pure-bred breeding animals, weighing < 
50kg 
OAP  010392 Live swine other than pure-bred breeding animals, weighing 
50kg/more 
OAP  010600 Other live animals. 
OAP  020820 Frogs'legs 
OAP  030760 Snails (excl. sea snails) 
OAP  040900 Natural honey 
OAP  041000 Edible products of animal origin, n.e.s. 
OAP  050210 Pigs'/hogs'/boars' bristles & hair & waste thereof 
OAP  050290 Badger hair & other brush making hair; waste of such 
bristles/hair 
OAP  050400 Guts, bladders & stomachs of animals (other than fish), whole & 
pieces thereof, fresh/chilled/frozen/salted/in brine/dried/smoked 
OAP  050610 Ossein & bones treated with acid 
OAP  050690 Bones & horn-cores, unworked, defatted, simply prepared but not 
cut to shape, treated with acid/degelatinised (excl. of 0506.10); 
powder & waste of these products 
OAP 050710 Ivory; ivory powder & waste 
OAP  050790 Tortoise-shell, whalebone & whalebone hair, horns, antlers, 
hooves, nails, claws & beaks, unworked/simply prepared but not 
cut to shape; powder & waste of these products 
OAP  051000 Ambergris, castoreum, civet & musk; cantharides; bile, 
whether/not dried; glands & other animal products used in the 
preparation of pharmaceutical products, 
fresh/chilled/frozen/othw. provisionally perserved 
OAP  051199 Animal products not elsewhere specified/incld. (excl. of 0511.10);  
dead animals of Ch. 1, unfit for human consumption 
OAP  152190 Beeswax, other insect waxes & spermaceti, whether/not 
refined/coloured 
OAP  410110 Whole hides and skins of bovine animals, of a weight per skin not 
exceeding 8 kg when simply dried, 10 kg when dry-salted, or 14 
kg when fresh, wet-salted  
otherwise preserved 
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OAP  410121 Other hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted :-- 
Whole 
OAP  410122 Other hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted :-- 
Butts and bends 
OAP  410129 Other hides and skins of bovine animals, fresh or wet-salted :-- 
Other 
OAP  410130 Other hides and skins of bovine animals, otherwise preserved 
OAP  410140 Hides and skins of equine animals 
OAP  410210 Raw skins of sheep/lambs (fresh/salted/dried/limed/pickled/othw. 
preserved but not tanned/ parchment-dressed/further prepared), 
with wool on 
OAP  410221 Raw skins of sheep/lambs, pickled but not tanned/ 
parchment-dressed/further prepared, without wool on 
OAP  410229 Raw skins of sheep/lambs (fresh/salted/dried/limed/pickled/othw. 
preserved, 
but not tanned/ parchment-dressed/further prepared), split, 
other than those  
excld. by Note 1 (c) to this Ch.. 
OAP  410310 Of goats or kids 
OAP  410320 Raw hides & skins of reptiles (fresh/salted/dried/limed/pickled/ 
othw. preserved,but not tanned/parchment-dressed/further 
prepared), 
whether/ not dehaired/split  
OAP  410390 Raw hides&skins (fresh,/salted, dried, limed, pickled/othw. 
preserved, 
but not tanned, parchment-dressed/further prepared), 
whether/not dehaired/split, other than those excld. by Note 1 (b) 
OAP  430110 Raw furskins, of mink, whole, with/without head/tail/paws 
OAP  430120 Of rabbit or hare, whole, with or without head, tail or paws 
OAP  430130 Raw furskins, of lamb: Astrakhan, Broadtail, Caracul, Persian & 
similar lamb, 
Indian/Chinese/Mongolian/Tibetan lamb, whole, with/without 
head/tail/paws 
OAP  430140 Of beaver, whole, with or without head, tail or paws 
OAP  430150 Of musk-rat, whole, with or without head, tail or paws 
OAP  430160 Raw furskins, of fox, whole, with/without head/tail/paws 
OAP  430170 Of seal, whole, with or without head, tail or paws 
OMT (GTAP)  
POUM 020711 Meat of fowls of species Gallus domesticus, not cut in pieces, 
fresh/chilled 
POUM 020712 Meat of fowls of species Gallus domesticus, not cut in pieces, 
frozen 
POUM 020713 Cuts & edible offal of species Gallus domesticus, fresh/chilled 
POUM 020714 Cuts & edible offal of species Gallus domesticus, frozen 
POUM 020724 Meat of turkeys, not cut in pieces, fresh/chilled 
POUM 020725 Meat of turkeys, not cut in pieces, frozen 
POUM 020726 Cuts & edible offal of turkey, fresh/chilled 
POUM 020727 Cuts & edible offal of turkey, frozen 
POUM 020732 Meat of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, not cut in pieces, fresh/chilled 
POUM 020733 Meat of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, not cut in pieces, frozen 
POUM 020734 Fatty livers of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, fresh/chilled 
POUM 020735 Meat & edible meat offal of ducks/geese/guinea fowls  
(excl. of 0207.32-0207.34), fresh/chilled 
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POUM 020736 Meat & edible meat offal of ducks/geese/guinea fowls  
(excl. of 0207.32-0207.34), frozen 
POUM 160231 Prepared/preserved preparations of turkey (excl. homogenised 
preparations) 
POUM 160232 Prepared/preserved preparations of fowls of the genus Gallus 
domesticus  
(excl. homogenised preparations) 
POUM 160239 Prepared/preserved preparations of fowls of 01.05  
(excl. turkey & fowls of the genus Gallus domesticus) 
OMT 020311 Carcasses/half-carcasses of swine, fresh/chilled 
OMT 020312 Hams, shoulders & cuts thereof , fresh/chilled, bone-in 
OMT 020319 Meat of swine (excl. carcasses/half-carcasses/hams/shoulders & 
cuts thereof), fresh/chilled 
OMT 020321 Carcasses/half-carcasses of swine, frozen 
OMT 020322 Hams, shoulders & cuts thereof , frozen, bone-in 
OMT 020329 Meat of swine (excl. carcasses/half-carcasses/hams/shoulders & 
cuts thereof), frozen 
OMT 020810 Meat & edible meat offal of rabbits/hares, fresh/chilled/frozen 
OMT 020890 Meat&edible meat offal, n.e.s., fresh/chilled/frozen 
OMT 021011 Hams, shoulders & cuts thereof , of swine, salted/in 
brine/dried/smoked, 
bone-in 
OMT 021012 Bellies (streaky) & cuts thereof , of swine, salted/in 
brine/dried/smoked 
OMT 021019 Meat of swine (excl. hams/shoulders & cuts thereof & bellies 
(streaky) & cuts thereof ), salted/in brine/dried/smoked 
OMT 021020 Meat of bovine animals, salted/in brine/dried/smoked 
OMT 021090 Other, including edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal 
OMT 150300 Lard stearin, lard oil, oleostearin, oleo-oil & tallow oil, not 
emulsified/mixed/ 
othw. prepared 
OMT 150410 Fish-liver oils & their fractions, whether/not refined but not 
chemically modified 
OMT 150420 Fats & oils & their fractions, of fish, other than liver oils, whether/ 
not refined but not chemically modified 
OMT 150430 Fats & oils & their fractions, of marine mammals, whether/ 
not refined but not chemically modified 
OMT 150600 Animal fats & oils & fractions thereof (excl. of 1501.00-1505.00), 
whether/ 
not refined but not chemically modified 
OMT 160100 Sausages & similar products, of meat/meat offal/blood; food 
preparations  
based on these products 
OMT 160220 Prepared/preserved preparations of liver of any animal 
OMT 160241 Hams & cuts thereof 
OMT 160242 Shoulders of swine & cuts thereof 
OMT 160249 Prepared/preserved preparations of swine  
(excl. of 1602.41, 1602.42 & homogenised preparations), incl. 
mixtures 
OMT 160250 Prepared/preserved preparations of bovine animals  
(excl. homogenised preparations), incl. mixtures 
OMT 160290 Preparations of prepared/preserved meat (excl. of 1602.10-
1602.50),  
incl. preparations of blood of any animal 
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OMT 160300 Extracts & juices of meat/fish/crustaceans/molluscs/other aquatic 
invertebrates 
OMT  230110 Flours, meals & pellets of meat/meat offal; greaves 
CTL (GTAP) 
BFCTL 010210 Live bovine animals: pure-bred breeding animals 
BFCTL 010290 Live bovine animals other than pure-bred breeding animals 
CTL  010420 Live goats 
CTL  010111 Horses :-- Pure-bred breeding animals 
CTL  010119 Horses :-- Other 
CTL  010120 Asses, mules and hinnies 
CTL  010410 Live sheep 
CTL  051110 Bovine semen 
CMT (GTAP) 
BFCMT 020110 Carcasses/half-carcasses of bovine animals, fresh/chilled 
BFCMT 020120 Meat of bovine animals, fresh/chilled (excl. of 0201.10), bone-in 
BFCMT 020130 Meat of bovine animals, fresh/chilled, boneless 
BFCMT 020210 Carcasses/half-carcasses of bovine animals, frozen 
BFCMT 020220 Meat of bovine animals, frozen (excl. of 0202.10), bone-in 
BFCMT 020230 Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless 
CMT 020410 Carcasses/half-carcasses of lamb, fresh/chilled 
CMT 020421 Carcasses/half-carcasses of sheep (excl. lamb), fresh/chilled 
CMT 020422 Meat of sheep (excl. lamb & carcasses), fresh/chilled, bone-in 
CMT 020423 Meat of sheep (excl. lamb), fresh/chilled, boneless 
CMT 020430 Carcasses/half-carcasses of lamb, frozen 
CMT 020441 Carcasses/half-carcasses of sheep (excl. lamb), frozen 
CMT  020442 Meat of sheep (excl. lamb & carcasses), frozen, bone-in 
CMT  020443 Meat of sheep (excl. lamb), frozen, boneless 
CMT  020450 Meat of goats, fresh/chilled/frozen 
CMT  020500 Meat of horses/asses/mules/hinnies, fresh/chilled/frozen 
CMT  020610 Edible offal of bovine animals, fresh/chilled 
CMT  020621 Tongues of bovine animals, frozen 
CMT  020622 Livers of bovine animals, frozen 
CMT  020629 Edible offal of bovine animals (excl. tongues & livers), frozen 
CMT  020630 Edible offal of swine, fresh/chilled 
CMT  020641 Livers of swine, frozen 
CMT  020649 Edible offal of swine (excl. liver), frozen 
CMT  020680 Edible offal, n.e.s., fresh/chilled 
CMT  020690 Edible offal, n.e.s., frozen 
CMT  020900 Pig fat (free of lean meat) & poultry fat (not rendered/othw. 
extracted),  
fresh/chilled/frozen/salted/in brine/dried/smoked 
CMT  150100 Pig fat (including lard) and poultry fat 
CMT  150200 
Fats of bovine animals, sheep or goats, other than those of 
heading No. 15.03. 
CMT  150510 Wool grease, crude 
CMT  150590 Other 
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Annex 4. Stages in the estimation of AVEs for NTMs 
0. Select an evaluation approach: quantity-value, quantity-volume or prices 
1. Building the dataset for estimation 
1.1. Starting either with bilateral trade data (values or quantities), or bilateral trade unit 
values, depending on the selected approach in 0, normally at HS 6-digit. Options: 
● Cross-section: one year 
● Panel: several years (can be continuous or with a constant gap) 
1.2. Merge the NTMs dataset: options 
● Cross-section (assume that the measures recorded apply in the year(s) 
selected in 1.1. 
● Time series (using the variables starting and ending dates of application) 
● Using only the number of measures applied by an importer to the world or 
adding up also bilateral measures applied to specific origins 
1.3. Merge gravity type explanatory variables 
2. Model selection: depending on the approach selected in 0 
2.1. Price approach: lineal OLS model 
2.2. Quantity (volume or trade): Options 
● Heckman two stages approach: to estimate the probability of trade and the 
intensity of trade. Problem of consistency in the second stage because of the 
log-linearization.  
● Poisson: simultaneously takes into account zero and non-zero trade values. 
Favored by recent econometric literature. 
3. Model specification 
Choose the explanatory variables: 
● Core gravity variables (e.g. distance, colony, GDP)  
● Trade policy variables (e.g. RTAs, tariffs) 
● Fixed effects (e.g. exporter, importer, country-pairs, year, sector) 
● NTM variables: as dummies (presence/absence); as continuous (i.e. number of 
measures); aggregated all/several types of measures; disaggregated for 
SPS/TBT/…; or further disaggregated (up to 4-digits); full or selected coverage 
of types of measures 
4. Sample 
Choose which subset of the data is going to be used in each estimated model: 
● Selection of exporters / importers. It can be based on the research interest, 
importance on trade 
● Selection of sectors 
● Selection of years: cross-section, panel and which years 
5. Sectors options 
5.1. Estimate the model for each individual HS 6-digit line. Decisions on the aggregation 
up to the selected sector aggregate: 
● Exclude/not exclude coefficients (on NTMs) without economic sense (eg. 
negative coefficients in the price approach; values over 100%) 
66 
● Exclude/not exclude statistically not-significant coefficients 
 Select the significance 
 Replace by 0 or by missing the non-significant coefficient 
● Selection of HS 6-digit weights. Normally, trade weights but: 
  One year (and which year) 
  Several years average (and which years) 
5.2. Estimate the model at the final aggregation. The NTM impact will be measured by a 
single coefficient that will capture the average impact on the selected sub-sectors 
6. Routes/Countries 
6.1. Interaction approach: interacting the NTM variable by the routes of interest 
6.2. Country characteristic approach:  
● Building one or several variables that measure a characteristic of the 
importer/exporter (e.g. factor endowments, trade shares) 
● Calculate the AVE at specific values of these variables 
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